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Chapter 1: Small Donors and Campaign Finance in Federal Elections

The election of 2020 was the most expensive federal election cycle in U.S. history, taking
a trend of gradual increases in spending in presidential cycles and blowing it out of the water
with a greater than 100% increase over spending in 2016.1 Unsurprisingly, eight of the ten most
expensive Senate races in U.S. history also occurred in 2020, with spending data as of midOctober.2 Money flooded the system, and 2020 marked a continuing change in the makeup of the
donor population, as 22% of total money raised through September came from small donations,
including $1.7 billion given to Democrats and $1 billion to Republicans, up from 15% in 2016.3
Small donations are generally defined as aggregate contributions of under $200 (to a
single candidate), at which point a donor’s information has to be disclosed to the FEC.4 Those
aggregate contributions below $200 are thus unitemized (i.e. unreported at the donor level) by
candidates, and can be referred to using that term, while contributions above $200 are itemized
contributions. As more donors reach an aggregate total of over $200 as the election cycle draws
to a close, their money no longer counts as small donations, and causes estimates of small
donation totals (As a share of all contributions) to change (on the other hand, newer donors may
contribute at the end of the campaign). This surge in small donations was very evident in
expensive Senate races,5 and may have important implications for the future of Congressional
“2020 election to cost $14 billion, blowing away spending records,” OpenSecrets.org, October 28, 2020,
https://www.opensecrets.org/news/2020/10/cost-of-2020-election-14billion-update.
2
Ibid.
3
Ibid.
4
Disclosure laws use a sum of an individual’s contributions, so someone who donates $1 to the same candidate 201
times is not a small donor.
5
As of October 2020, the six candidates with the most raised from small donors were, in order: Jaime Harrison,
Amy McGrath, Mark Kelly, Lindsey Graham, Sara Gideon, and Marth McSally. Both Harrison and McGrath raised
more than $50 million and 50% of their funds from small donors.
“Large Versus Small Individual Donations” (web page), OpenSecrets.org (website), accessed November 17, 2020,
https://www.opensecrets.org/elections-overview/large-vs-small-donations?cycle=2020&type=A&t0total+money+raised=Raised+over+%24100k.
1
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fundraising: At the start of the 116th Congress (2019-2020), Democrats in the House introduced
and passed a House Resolution (H.R. 1) that would match the first $200 contributed by an
individual to a specific candidate with six times as much money in public funds.6 The bill did not
pass a Republican Senate.
This project looks at the role of small donations in American elections, focusing on the
type of candidates who attract small donations and any connection between those donations and
electoral success, measured using vote share. I will leverage the Database on Ideology, Money in
Politics, and Elections (DIME) for information about candidates, such as party, district, gender,
and incumbency status, as well as for its CFscore ideology measure (described below). In
addition, I use information on fundraising and election results from the FEC, district partisanship
information from the Cook Political Report, Facebook advertising statistics from the company’s
ad archive, and Congressional district median income information from human rights activist
Adam Isacson’s website.
CFscores are an ideology score based on clustering of individual contributors, with DWNOMINATE scores (which are a commonly used scaling of members of Congress based on rollcall voting) serving as a base.7 Individual donors can be assigned ideology scores based on the
known ideologies of candidates they donate to, then scores can be assigned for all candidates
based on a weighted average of the scores of their contributors. CFscores are able to give scores
to candidates who do not have a history of roll-call votes, and incorporate political donors’ views
of candidate issue positions that rarely or never appear in votes. This means that candidates who

Richard H. Pildes, “Participation and Polarization,” University of Pennsylvania Journal of Constitutional Law 22,
no. 2 (2020): 348.
7
Adam Bonica, “Mapping the Ideological Marketplace” (2014): 2-3.
https://web.stanford.edu/~bonica/papers/bonica_ajps_mimp_2014.pdf.
6
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have a more-bipartisan donor base will appear less extreme, while candidates whose donors are
all party loyalists will appear more extreme, independent of votes. Still, a candidate who has
more donor overlap with, say, Joe Manchin will likely have a more moderate score than a
candidate with fewer common donors, even if all donors to those two candidates are Democrats.
Ultimately, CFscores predict roll call votes at about a 92.8% accuracy rate, 1% better than party
identification alone, and 1% worse than the DW-Nominate scores based off those votes.8 More
information about CFscores is provided in the appendix to this chapter.
In this chapter, I plan on reviewing the issue of money in politics more generally, starting
with an overview of how our current campaign finance system affects our politics and how
Supreme Court jurisprudence brought it there. Next, I will cover motivations for contributing as
a large or small donor, such as ideological agreement, party loyalty, or a desire for access or
influence. Finally, I’ll introduce the question of whether fundraising or spending ultimately
affects the outcome of elections. Chapter 2 further explores the motivations behind small
donations, and examines the relationship between gender, candidate experience, district
competitiveness, Facebook spending and small donations. Chapter 3 then examines how
campaign finance affects election results, and includes linear models for the relationship between
small donations, larger donations, comparative spending, and a candidate’s final vote share.
Small donors have the potential to play an increasingly large role in the financing of
political campaigns, and it is valuable to understand how these changes influence electoral
outcomes. In the concluding chapter, I review the main findings and consider the main
implications that I can draw from my analysis. These include the significant association between

Adam Bonica, “Are Donation-Based Measures of Ideology Valid Predictors of Individual-Level Policy
Preferences?” (July 18, 2018), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3087782: 6.
8
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more-extreme CFscores and greater receipts of small donations, but worse general election
performance than similar but more-moderate candidates. Small donations are also associated
with lower candidate performance than large donations, but more broadly, candidates who
outspend their opponent outperform when compared to the performance of their party’s
presidential candidate in their district. Importantly, this advantage for spending disappears in the
closest (and thus more high-profile) races.

How Does Money Affect the Work of Congress?
A number of academics and legal scholars have bemoaned the importance of “big
money” in politics, a sentiment that, while not prominent, appears to be shared by the American
people. Richard Hasen has claimed that we have “a system in which economic inequalities,
inevitable in a free market economy, are transformed into political inequalities that affect both
electoral and legislative outcomes.”9 In Republic, Lost, Lawrence Lessig cites a post-Citizens
United poll in which 70 percent of respondents agreed with a statement that Congressional
representatives are “controlled” by the people, PACs, and interest groups who fund their
campaigns.10
Republican megadonor Sheldon Adelson (who died in early 2021) is one example of a
bankroller who could be viewed as “controlling” specific candidates. Adelson heavily backed
Newt Gingrich in the 2012 Republican Party, and political scientist Raymond La Raja argues he
did so to “advertise his strong preference for policies that limited government regulations and

9

Richard Hasen, Plutocrats United: Campaign Money, the Supreme Court, and the Distortion of American
Elections (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2016): 15.
10
Lawrence Lessig, Republic, Lost. (New York: Hachette Book Group, 2015): 167.

5

supported Israel,” positions pushed by Gingrich’s campaign.11 Richard Hasen, meanwhile,
describes how Chris Christie had a private meeting to apologize to Adelson for describing the
West Bank and Gaza Strip as “occupied territories.”12 Gingrich did not win in 2012, nor Christie
in 2016, but it’s clear Adelson held important sway in the politics of the Republican Party. Even
if this is merely an appearance, it’s deeply concerning to advocacy groups like the Brennan
Center for Justice, which argues “the reality, or even the perception, that campaign donors call
the shots on major policy decisions is deeply corrosive to our democracy.”13 And whether or not
the general public continues to believe the political process is corrupted by campaign cash,
members of Congress have been frank about its negative effects.
Consider U.S. Rep.-turned MSNBC anchor Joe Scarborough, who claims that during the
1990s, “across the spectrum, money changed votes;” or Eric Fingerhut of Ohio, who admitted
“the completely frank and honest answer” about money is that it “has a serious and profound
impact on not only the issues that are considered in Congress, but also on the outcome of those
issues.”14 Much of this connection is likely connected to the work of lobbyists, who Leon Panetta
has described as “indispensable to politicians” and “in the driver’s seat…they basically know
that the members have nowhere else to turn for money.”15 Even when politicians do not consider
the fundraising implications of taking a particular issue position, they often receive just one side
of issues when meeting with lobbyists and top donors. As Senator Chris Murphy (D-CT) states,

Raymond J. La Raja and Brian F. Schaffner, “The Ideological Wellsprings of Campaign Money,” In Campaign
Finance and Political Polarization: When Purists Prevail (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2015): 48.
12
Hasen, Plutocrats United, 11-12.
13
Gareth Fowler and Daniel I. Weiner, “Understanding H.R. 1’s Public Financing Provisions,” Brennan Center for
Justice (September 20, 2019),
https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/analysis/Understanding%20HR1%20Public%20Financing.pdf: 2.
14
Both from Lessig, Republic, Lost, 133.
15
Ibid, 104.
11
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“you’re hearing a lot about problems that bankers have and not a lot of problems that people who
work in the mill in Thomaston, Conn., have.”16
The other cause for this connection is politicians’ understanding that organizations may
advocate in elections in favor of either them or their opponent based on their stance on particular
issues. Bob Kerrey, a former Senator from Nebraska, has stated that you ask yourself “is
Americans for Prosperity going to advertise against me in a primary, yes or no?” and “if I do
something about” global warming, “I know the Koch brothers are going to run an ad against
me.”17 It’s generally uncommon for incumbents to lose to well-funded primary challengers, but it
sounds like Kerrey would not have risked it.
In their aptly-titled paper “Why Is There So Little Money in U.S. Politics?” Stephen
Ansolabehere, John De Figueiredo, and James Snyder disagree with assertions of damaging links
between campaign cash and votes, despite theoretical “astronomically high rates of return” from
favorable policies obtained through disbursements.18 In a survey of forty previous studies on
PAC contributions,19 they note three-quarters of the studies found no significant connection or a
negative connection, in which increased contributions led to less support for an issue.20 They also
point out the results from a sample of 94 executives from 12 unidentified “large corporations,” in
which the average executive donated 0.05 % of their income, hardly different from the 0.04 %
share for all Americans.21 Instead, they argue for the view of contributions “as a form of

Fowler and Weiner, “Understanding H.R. 1’s Public Financing Provisions,” 3.
Hasen, Plutocrats United, 51-52
18
Stephen Ansolabehere, John M. De Figueiredo, and James M. Snyder, “Why Is There So Little Money in U.S.
Politics?” The Journal of Economic Perspectives 17, no. 1 (2003): 111.
19
Political Action Committees (PACs) collect individual contributions before contributing that money to candidates,
and are often affiliated with corporations, industries, and labor unions.
20
Ibid, 112-114
21
Ibid, 118-119
16
17
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consumption – or, in the language of politics, participation.”22 From that perspective, donors
participate because of the social or emotional benefits of doing so, rather than for the potential
financial implications. It’s an expensive form of consumption for many participants too – 0.06%
of Americans give $200 or more in a federal election cycle, and those 0.06% account for 65% of
all disclosed contributions originating from individuals.2324
And despite the apparent lack of connection between PAC activity and votes on desired
policies, interest groups still participated in the elections studied by Ansolabehere et al. They
suggest that groups might serve merely as a more effective conduit or another consumer, but also
indicate that interest groups may look for “access, rather than policy directly” and “give a little”
to “get a little.”25 Indeed, a lack of connection between money and roll call votes does not mean
that politicians can’t “skew policies in ways preferred by individual donors.”26 Any study of this
topic should also in theory cover cases in which candidates adopt positions in anticipation of
future support.
Ultimately, the influence of lobbyists and campaign cash in Congress has more to do with
providing direction to members of Congress who already support a particular stance than
converting other members. As Richard Hasen notes, “Usually, the lobbyist’s role is to provide
support and useful information for a position the legislator already holds. At other times, the
issue of interest to the lobbyist (and her client) is one the legislator has no firm position or even
knowledge about.”27 Hasen does note that lobbyists “often have a difficult time getting elected

22

Ibid, 117
La Raja and Schaffner, “The Ideological Wellsprings of Campaign Money,” 40.
24
Shane Goldmacher, “Dozen Megadonors Gave $3.4 Billion, One in Every 13 Dollars, Since 2009,” New York
Times, April 20, 2021, https://www.nytimes.com/2021/04/20/us/politics/megadonors-political-spending.html.
25
Ansolabehere, De Figueiredo, and Snyder, “Why Is There So Little Money in U.S. Politics?” 126-127.
26
Lessig, Republic, Lost, 139.
27
Hasen, Plutocrats United: 54.
23
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officials to take action,”28 though if the lobbyist is a conduit for information it should be much
easier to work at the margins, pushing existing and popular bills in a desired direction.
Even if it is unclear whether money has an outcome on the content and passage of
legislation, the constant need to fundraise is hamstringing the ability of Congress to legislate.
Lessig notes that members of Congress spend anywhere from 30-70 precent of their time
fundraising, which leaves them with less time to read increasingly-lengthy bills (something they
rarely do) and attend committee meetings. Indeed, the annual number of committee meetings in
the House was halved between the 1970s and 2010.29 Many members of Congress dislike the
constant focus on fundraising, but only speak out following retirement.
When announcing his retirement in 2016, New York Rep. Steve Israel stated “I don’t
think I can spend another day in another call room making another call begging for money,” and
estimated he spent almost 6,000 hours raising money across his eight terms30 (which, to his
credit, is just an hour a day). Rodney Alexander, a Louisiana Representative, claimed that raising
money is “the main business, and it’s 24 hours a day raising money…. It’s not fair for the
member, not fair for constituency to have to be approached every day or two or week or two
about campaign contributions.”31 Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez reinforces this point, Tweeting in
January 2019 (just after entering office): “This week I learned some members spend as little as 5
hours per WEEK in their office bc their fundraising commitments are so high.”32 In November of

28

Hasen, Plutocrats United: 56.
Lessig, Republic, Lost: 138-139.
30
New York Times Editorial Board, “Beggars Banquet in Congress,” New York Times, January 7, 2016,
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/07/opinion/beggars-banquet-in-congress.html.
31
Andy Kroll, “Retiring GOP Congressman: Fundraising is the “Main Business” of Congress,” Mother Jones,
August 8, 2013, https://www.motherjones.com/politics/2013/08/retiring-rodney-alexander-congressmanfundraising-congress/.
32
Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez, Twitter post, January 13, 2019, 9:34 a.m.,
https://twitter.com/aoc/status/1084458794015436801.
29
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that year, she Tweeted that “I haven’t picked up a phone once this year to dial for dollars”33 and
“Since I don’t spend hours each day asking for money, I spend a lot more time legislating,
studying, & preparing/sitting in hearings.”34 Even if some of these statements are exaggerated,
it’s clear the current requirements of our financing system impose a tremendous burden on
members of Congress. And, as Lessig puts it, “If you learned that teachers at a public elementary
school that your kids attended were spending 30 percent of their time running bake sales to fund
their salaries rather than teaching your kids how to read, you’d be rightfully upset, too.”35
Campaign Finance at the Supreme Court
Recent efforts to “level the playing field” and decrease the emphasis on money in politics
have tended to fail at the Supreme Court, due to the perspective that efforts to limit spending
amount to restrictions on speech. Most of the current grounds for restricting spending come from
the goal or standard of blocking “quid pro quo” corruption as established in the 1976 case
Buckley v. Valeo.36 Buckley concerned the Federal Election Campaign Act’s “ceiling[s] on
expenditures,” which advanced a government interest related to “suppressing communication,”37
though the government argued the law regulated conduct rather than speech.38 In Buckley, Court
equated the use of expenditures to political speech, and not merely conduct, with the statement
that “virtually every means of communicating ideas in today’s mass society requires the
expenditure of money” and thus “a restriction on the amount of money a person or group can
spend…necessarily reduces the quantity of expression by restricting the number of issues

33

Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez, Twitter post, November 26, 2019, 8:02 p.m.,
https://twitter.com/AOC/status/1199493783685079040.
34
Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez, Twitter post, November 26, 2019, 8:11 p.m.,
https://twitter.com/AOC/status/1199495812214120450.
35
Lessig, Republic, Lost: 142.
36
La Raja and Schaffner, “The Ideological Wellsprings of Campaign Money,” 39-40.
37
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976): 17.
38
Ibid, 16.
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discussed, the depth of their exploration, and the size of the audience reached.”39 However, the
Court over a decade after Buckley has also considered the “corrosive and distorting effects of
immense aggregations of wealth…that have little or no correlation to the public’s support for the
corporation’s political ideas” in Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, which upheld
regulations on corporate independent expenditures. That was overturned in 2010 by Citizens
United.40
Citizens United outlined much of the Court’s current opinion on corruption, and describes
Buckley as “limited to quid pro quo,” the financial form of which is called “the hallmark of
corruption” and defined as “dollars for political favors.” The opinion then adds that “the
appearance of influence or access, furthermore, will not cause the electorate to lose faith in our
democracy.”41 The current Court has used Buckley to make it clear that as long as a campaign
finance law cannot be judged as curtailing the direct exchange of money for policy, and
presumably in that specific order, it will not be upheld, which makes any efforts to limit the
current surge in campaign spending unlikely.
Of course, as Richard Hasen notes, restricting the use of money could have “profoundly
bad effects” such as “censoring political activity, entrenching incumbents over challengers, or
giving special treatment to media corporations.”42 Furthermore, it is possible that lower
contribution limits, efforts to reduce lobbyist bundling, and restrictions on outside spending
would cause incumbents to spend more time fundraising, in races where the marginal dollar
might be more important.

39

Ibid, 19.
Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990), overruled by Citizens United v. Fed. Election
Comm'n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010): 660.
41
Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010): 359-360.
42
Hasen, Plutocrats, United, 16-17.
40
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Where Small Donors Come In
There is a second method of de-emphasizing “big money” in politics, and that is by
magnifying the importance of “small” money: Small donations, i.e. any total below a certain size
that raises concerns about a relationship with a candidate or member of Congress. Lessig divides
campaign contributions into three “buckets:” the smaller gifts whose contributors are not
individually tracked by the campaign, the larger contributions from “people or interests whose
interests are fairly transparent,” and money channeled through lobbyists.43 If candidates are
primarily interested in raising a minimum level of campaign cash, increasing the size of the first
bucket would decrease the importance of the latter two, and it would make it easier for
candidates to commit to not soliciting large donors and PACs for contributions. Furthermore, for
any flaws there may be in pandering to a loyal base in the hopes of raising more from small
donations, Lessig notes, “if there is pandering here to raise more cash, it is public pandering. It’s
the kind the opponent can take advantage of. It is the part that feeds political debate.”44
Magnifying the impact of small donations would also cause individual contributions to be
less top-heavy. In 2016, 15,810 individuals accounted for half of all contributions, down from
73,926 in 200045 (perhaps due to the striking down of aggregate contribution limits46). Donors
are also unrepresentative of the larger population – they are older, whiter, wealthier, and more
likely to be male than the average American.47 They are also 6 to 9 percentage points more likely
to vote in a general election.48 Whether or not the profile of the small donor is any more

43

Lessig, Republic, Lost, 120.
Lessig, Republic, Lost, 120.
45
Pildes, “Participation and Polarization,” 358.
46
McCutcheon v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 572 U.S. 185 (2014): 188.
47
La Raja and Schnaffer, “The Ideological Wellsprings of Campaign Money,” 44.
48
Seth J. Hill and Gregory A. Huber, “Representativeness and Motivations of the Contemporary Donorate: Results
from Merged Survey and Administrative Records,” Political Behavior 39 (2017): 5.
44
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representative of the broader population, donations at a lower level are much more egalitarian
and accessible; $50 or $100 is still a significant expense for many Americans, but a bag of potato
chips retails for at most a couple dollars, and Americans spent $6 billion on potato chips in 2012,
almost enough to fund that year’s entire slate of federal campaigns.49 It would be odd to ask
Americans to give up potato chips so they could fund campaigns, but if they did so, the majority
of campaign cash could then come from donors. It’s unclear how such a change would impact
candidate selections and election outcomes, but catering to donors and to voters may look more
similar if financing power is distributed more evenly.
Small Donors and Ideological Motivations
Small donations are not without their criticism, particularly because of the ideological
profile of the individual donor base relative to the population as a whole. Raymond La Raja and
Brian Schnaffer plotted histograms of the ideologies of registered voters and federal donors in
the 2010 election cycle, and while the histogram of registered voters is bell-shaped, the
distribution of donors is bimodal, towards the middles of the “liberal” and the “conservative”
regions.50 La Raja and Schnaffer, who support a more party-oriented system of campaign
finance, argue that in “candidate-centered” systems, candidates are “pulled towards the
ideological poles” by those “purist outsiders with strong policy preferences.”51
Though it makes sense for political parties, who are concerned with electoral success, to
serve as a moderating force in politics, it should be noted that more-liberal Democrats give to
their party (i.e. contributions directly to party committees) about as often as they give to
49

Hasen, Plutocrats United, 42.
La Raja and Schaffner, “The Ideological Wellsprings of Campaign Money,” 46.
51
Raymond J. La Raja and Brian F. Schaffner. “Campaign Finance Laws, Purists, and Pragmatists: Who Benefits?”
In Campaign Finance and Political Polarization: When Purists Prevail (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press,
2015): 24.
50
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candidates, while moderate Democrats give to candidates at a higher rate than they give to the
party.52 If more-liberal Democratic donors were interested in pushing or supporting an
ideological agenda against the moderating desire of the party, we would expect to see the
opposite relationship, which we do see from the Republican Party.53 In addition, La Raja and
Schnaffer’s argument rests on the belief that donors look to support broader ideological
preferences rather than ultra-specific policy objectives (like specific tariffs or subsidies) or a
simple desire for access. While there appears to be no clear and direct relationship between
campaign contributions and specific policy initiatives,54 there is some indication that individual
donors do push candidates towards the poles.
However, Seth Hill and Gregory Huber found that some of the ideological motivations
that lead to making campaign contributions include perceptions of the opposing party, with
Republicans more likely to donate in an election if they placed the Democratic Party as more
extreme on a seven-point Likert Scale.55 A 2014 Pew survey found a similar result for
Democrats, with those holding a “very unfavorable” view of the Republican Party almost twice
as likely to contribute as those who hold a “mostly unfavorable view.”56 Meanwhile, after
finding a low correlation between an individual contributor’s CFscore,57 a measure of ideology
based on what candidates different individuals choose to contribute to, and their policy ideology
(measured via CCES responses), Hill and Huber add that “within each party coalition,
contributors’ policy ideology is only somewhat related to the ideology one would estimate based
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upon the candidates to which they donate and the set of donations those candidates receive from
other groups and individual donors.” Based on these results, they conclude that “potential donors
appear to make the choice to contribute in light of the dynamics of two-party competition, and
use their contributions as complements to participation in elections.”58
However, in a 2019 study of small donations in the 2006-2010 U.S. House election
cycles, Tyler Culberson, Michael McDonald, and Suzanne Robbins found a strong relationship
between ideology and small donations raised for incumbents, while controlling for race
competitiveness, challenger quality, incumbent scandals, district demographics, and party.59 The
most ideologically extreme incumbents raised $306,557 more than the most moderate
incumbents,60 though ideology did not appear to affect small donations to challengers of
incumbents or candidates running for open seats,61 which may be due to a lack of name
recognition and “bona fides.” Michael Malbin has noted that in the 2012 election cycle, almost
half of the incumbents who raised more than $250,000 from small donors were in the more
ideologically extreme half of their party.62 Specific factors like race competitiveness can magnify
a candidate’s profile and lead to more small donations, but Bonica has found that for all regular
individual donors (of any amount), a candidate’s ideology is more important than the prospect of
access or maximizing the electoral chances of a particular party.63
Understanding the connection between small donors and candidate ideology helps us gain
a greater picture of how different types of candidates raise campaign cash. Incumbents raised just
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6.7% of their funds from small donors, compared to 21% for challengers,64 and are statistically
much more likely to receive money from business groups: Over 75% of money from business
groups goes to incumbents.65 Meanwhile, Adam Bonica found that only 48-55% of small
donations go to election winners, vs. 80-90% of corporate PAC money.66 Business-related funds
going to incumbents should not be a surprise, as Culberson et al. suggest that “materialistic
donors may be especially attracted to incumbents for the access they provide to the policymaking
process.”67 Similarly to businesses favoring winners and incumbents, most of the 30 wealthiest
Americans have CFscores more moderate than the average ideology for either the Republican or
Democratic Parties, with Charles Koch, George Soros, Sergey Brin, and Larry Page as the only
exceptions.68
Individuals with a desire for access and policy influence would have an incentive to
contribute to politicians on both sides of the aisle, depending on who controls the keys in any
given session, but there are clearly those with a larger political agenda as well. Even those
looking for influence may have specific goals related to taxes, their business interests, or other
preferences, which can be a negative influence on Congress, but they will still want to give to
candidates who will win, and those candidates are usually more moderate. Small donors have no
expectation of acquiring access, and should thus be more likely to contribute to candidates who
agree with them ideologically. Since those donors are also more likely to be on the ends of the
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political spectrum, it would make sense for the candidates they support for ideological reasons to
be more ideologically extreme.
President Trump’s campaign emails from the 2020 Presidential election can give an idea
of what drives an individual to donate. Emails described recipients as “President Trump’s
fiercest and most loyal defenders” and include appeals such as “The President wants to know
who stood by his side when the Radical Left came after him…he’s requested a list of every
Patriot who donates to this email in the NEXT HOUR. Will he see your name?”69 Within these
two cuts from longer messages, there is a clear appeal to the donor as an essential member of the
campaign who needs to help the candidate, and coded ideological language that plays on anger or
other feelings the donor already holds. These messages don’t target undecideds or individuals not
fully committed to a candidate, and feed off the partisanship that currently appears in the system.
Other Motivations for Contributions
However, in 2018 and in 2020, we saw a number of House challengers garner attention
not because of their ideological positions but because they had the potential to improve the
representation of various minority groups in Congress. The 2019-2020 Congress was the most
racially and ethnically diverse of all time, with 116 of the 435 lawmakers belonging to a minority
group,70 including new members like Deb Haaland (Native American), Sharice Davids (Native
American), Rashida Tlaib (Palestinian, also Muslim), Ilhan Omar (black, also Muslim), and
Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez (Hispanic/Latinx).71 Meanwhile, Republican gains in the House in the
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2020 cycle primarily came from female candidates, as the number of G.O.P. women in the
House nearly tripled from 13 to 36, just from races called by November 13th.72 While much of
this improvement can likely be attributed to improvements in recruiting a more diverse slate of
candidates, adding 23 new Republican women in one electoral cycle suggests that female
candidates might have held electoral or fundraising advantages over similarly-qualified men in
either the primary or the general election.
It’s unclear if women have either an advantage or disadvantage in elections: A 2015
study by Cecilia Hyunjung Mo found that, “even after controlling for explicit preferences, those
with implicit attitudes against female candidates are less likely to vote for the female
candidate,”73 though in that same study, she found that when presented with a choice between
strong male and female candidates, individuals chose the female candidate 56% of the time.74
These two findings are not necessarily mutually exclusive; if a subset of the population holds
implicit biases against female candidates, a larger subset may have implicit biases towards
female candidates. Such favoritism would likely present itself most in fundraising from small
donations, which is much more reliant on specific enthusiasm, though it would of course directly
impact election results themselves.
More-experienced challengers should also be more likely to attract donations of any sort,
as they are also more likely to win – individuals who have held elected office have, in most
situations, already run successful campaigns and demonstrated their ability to attract support.
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David Lublin studied the impact of different levels of past office on vote share, and found that
House incumbents on average get 7% less of the vote when their opponent is a former U.S.
Representative, vs. 5% for a Governor, Senator, or, surprisingly, lesser state officials, and 1% for
a state legislator.75 One might expect a higher share for a Governor or a Senator, since those
positions are more prestigious than U.S. Representative, but it’s also possible the difference is
mostly due to noise. Either way, the “quality” or past experience (since it is difficult to
empirically create a list of high-quality candidates) of a candidate should have an important
impact on both fundraising and outcome measures.
The Relationship Between Money and Electoral Outcomes
With the dramatic rise in campaign spending in recent cycles, we once again have to
consider the question of whether fundraising and spending is correlated with, or has an effect on,
electoral outcome. An assessment of many recent races suggests that it shouldn’t: As Richard
Hasen notes, Meg Whitman spent $140 million against Jerry Brown in 2010 and lost that
California gubernatorial election, while Dave Brat defeated Eric Cantor in a primary even though
“Cantor’s campaign spent more at steakhouses than his more conservative opponent spent on his
entire campaign.”76 Ultimately he claims it is just a “crass common liberal refrain that money
simply buys elections,”77 an idea that seems to have applicability to the 2020 federal cycle. Jaime
Harrison raised over $100 million by the end of the third quarter, $35 million more than Lindsey
Graham, and lost by 10 points.78 Theresa Greenfield raised twice as much as incumbent Joni
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Ernst, and lost as well.79 But Amy McGrath likely topped it by losing to Mitch McConnell by 20
points,80 worse than Alison Grimes did in 2014,81 despite raising $88 million by September.
Some of this can be ascribed to broader factors – as Adam Bonica notes, “outcomes in the
general election are primarily a function of district-partisanship, and to a lesser extent, national
partisan moods.”82
However, money and spending should matter: First, candidates who inspire more support
should receive more in donations, though they should specifically have a larger number of
donors. The total amount raised can be more dependent on the size of specific donations. For
example, a candidate who does well with $5,000 donors but not $500 donors can receive more
money than a candidate with the converse, and the same can be done at the small donor level
with $100 and $10. Of course, the real picture is more complex than this basic counterexample,
but if the number of unique donors is sufficiently close, size of donations will matter.
The second reason why money and spending should correlate with electoral outcome
relates more to the latter subject. By spending, a candidate is able to further “speak” and
advertise who they are, what their political positions are, and why they should be elected. The
more a candidate spends on organizing and advertising, the more they are able to amplify their
message, and the more voters they are able to reach with that message. Of course, money only
gets a candidate so far if they do not use it properly or voters tire from a bombardment of
advertisements (with the negative connotation of trying to “buy” an election to boot). Though
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she may have been trying to dispel the notion that House Democrats lost seats due to attitudes
about the Progressive movement, Alexandria Ocasio Cortez stated “Conor Lamb spent $2,000 on
Facebook the week before the election….The fact of the matter is if you’re not spending
$200,000 on Facebook with fund-raising, persuasion, volunteer recruitment, get-out-the-vote the
week before the election, you are not firing on all cylinders.”83
On the other hand, the highly negative 2020 Senate race in Maine has led some voters to
make statements to the New York Times like “the approach on the ads and campaigning was
disgusting enough that I didn’t want to vote for the person anymore” and “to think that kind of
money was spent is kind of like a slap in the face of America.”84 The former Maine head of
Obama’s campaign claims that with the amount of money available “this race got out of control”
and that “if this race is $30 million from both sides, you’re in a better place.”8586 There is also
some evidence that ads themselves have just a marginal impact, if any at all. In 2006, Rick Perry
was virtually assured victory in the Texas gubernatorial race, and his campaign ran a field
experiment by running ads in randomly-chosen markets and tracking the polling results. Any
bump from advertising disappeared within a week of when the ads stopped running.87
It is also possible to spend loads of money without attempting to convince voters: By
September of 2020, the Trump campaign had spent $350 million on raising additional funds,
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nearly half of its $800 million in expenditures up to that point.88 Such a focus on spending
money to make money clouds any connection between fundraising and natural support, as well
as on money and results, since there is unusual extra effort towards fundraising, and that also
takes away funds usually used to persuade voters.
Despite the examples to the contrary, the candidate who raises the most money wins
about 80% of Senate races and 90% of House races.89 Part of the reason the connection is so
strong is money following winners in non-competitive or unopposed races; FiveThirtyEight’s
Maggie Koreth states that Bonica and Richard Lau agree that “the strong raw association
between raising the most cash and winning probably has more to do with big donors who can
tell…that one candidate is more likely to win – and then they give that person all their money.”90
We’ve seen this already with corporate PAC donations, where 80-90% of that money follows
election winners.91 But when less than 20% of House seats are really at odds an given year, a
90% win rate for the fundraising leader is still not that high.
The scholarly analysis of fundraising and vote share has found mixed results for
correlation between the two. Economist Steven Levitt’s 1994 analysis of repeated candidate
matchups in House races found that an extra $100,000 in spending, a large amount at the time,
leads to a gain of just under 0.33 percent in vote share, an amount too low to be statistically
significant.92 A broader range of studies have found incumbent spending to be largely
ineffective, particularly in the House, though higher levels of incumbent spending lead to greater
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success in Senate races.93 Prior to Levitt’s 1994 paper, many cross-sectional studies had found
large returns on House challenger spending, though Levitt found a tenth of the return after
controlling for candidate quality and district fixed effects.94 Meanwhile, in a study of open-seat
House races, Brad Alexander found significant results for the positive impact of PAC
contributions, in-state contributions, and relative spending, and for the negative impact of being
self-financed.95
Even if the connection between money and success is mixed at best in general elections,
there is better reason to believe money has an important impact on primary contests. In contested
primaries, the candidate who raises the most money wins 79% of the time,96 a figure lower than
that for general elections but large considering there are fewer races where victory is more-orless assured by district partisanship. And an OLS model developed by Adam Bonica to analyze
the connection between fundraising and primary outcomes estimated that doubling a candidate’s
fundraising total leads to a 45 percent increase in vote share, with both figures scaled relative to
the contest average.97 Bonica attributes much of the connection to the importance of early
fundraising in demonstrating the viability of a campaign – it’s the reason why EMILY’s List was
created (it stands for Early Money is Like Yeast).98 The DCCC has also heavily emphasized
fundraising viability, with its 2006 chair, Rahm Emmanuel, stating “the first third of your
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campaign is money, money, money. The second third is money, money, and press. And the last
third is votes, press, and money.”99
This early fundraising usually comes from the individuals closest to the candidate, which
EMILY’s List calls the “Personal Circle”: family members and close friends or professional
contacts.100 Bonica argues this leads to the overrepresentation of lawyers101 and other wealthy
professions in Congress, because “even the most compelling candidates will struggle to keep
pace if their personal networks are devoid of anyone who fits the typical profile of a political
donor.”102 Ultimately, he believes that “requiring that candidates report as a line item the number
of unique donors giving to a campaign, regardless of donation size, alongside total receipts could
help to better signal levels of support.”103 However, this of course assumes that fundraising
viability has a direct relationship with primary success, as opposed to better candidates attracting
more early money or early money giving a candidate the opportunity to run a larger campaign.
We do know that larger campaigns once again aren’t everything, as the effect of being selffunded is negative.104
The other issue with the number of unique donors, and an issue that plagues the
connection between fundraising and results, is that many of the individuals who fund a given
campaign will live outside of that candidate’s district/state, and some candidates who do well
with donors from other regions may not do as well with their own electorate – not to mention the
attacks that can be levelled for being funded by “Wall Street,” “Hollywood elite,” or the Koch
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brothers. The solution to issues like these ultimately rests in better understanding why
individuals contribute to certain candidates and not others, but if donors are less likely to give to
non-competitive candidates, we should expect those receiving significant funding to be
competitive-enough candidates for their district.
Summary
If current trends hold, we should expect small donors to play an increasingly important
role in funding campaigns, one that could be further magnified by Congressional legislation. The
emergence of small donors as a viable “bucket” to draw from has the potential to make members
of Congress less beholden to business groups and large individual contributors, both in terms of
the constant need to fundraise and the pressure to provide desired legislative outcomes, but other
strategies would need to take their place. If a candidate can raise $10,000 from a brief video on
Twitter, or $100,000 from a weekly email blast, they can spend less time on the phone, but may
differ their rhetoric and specific policy positions to cater to a different profile of individual.
Increasing the share of contributions from small donations should increase the share that goes to
challengers, and to more ideologically-extreme candidates, though the former is not problematic,
perhaps unlike the latter.
Still, as small donations move more into the mainstream, and control of government has
become more contentious, it is possible that donation patterns have changed somewhat. Partisan
control of Congress could be more important than ideology in directing the flow of small
donations, and donors might also prefer to support the candidates making Congress increasingly
diverse. Of course, even if these factors significantly affect small donations, the impact of
ideology may not have changed. And it’s clear that, as more money enters the system, a
qualitative assessment would suggest the impact of that money is lessening and, in some cases,
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may hurt those who spend too much of it, though it is still possible that a sum of small donations
or any sum of individual donors is a strong indicator of enthusiasm for a candidate. Many of
these questions can be answered with available data, though work done without surveying the
donors themselves will still leave actual causes and motivations unclear.
In the next chapter, I will discuss the relationship between ideology and a candidate’s
receipt of small donations, establishing that candidates who have more-extreme CFscores receive
significantly more in small donations than their peers. I will also discuss trends in small
donations over time, and examine the possible impact of campaign strategy on fundraising
performance.

Appendix to Chapter 1: DIME/CFscores
A common element of Adam Bonica’s work, and other recent studies in campaign
finance, are CF-scores, also known as DIME scores, from the Database on Ideology, Money in
Politics, and Elections (DIME).105 Unlike DW-nominate scores, which are based on roll-call
votes, these scores are calculated based on clustering of contributors, with DW-nominate scores
as a foundational basis. Bonica views the issue of giving as an allocation problem, where a
contributor attempts to maximize a utility function across the set of all eligible recipients. 106 The
primary advantage of CF-scores is the ability to calculate an ideology estimate for more
candidates than those who are current or past members of Congress (those who have a history of

105

https://data.stanford.edu/dime.
Adam Bonica, “Mapping the Ideological Marketplace” (2014): 2-3.
https://web.stanford.edu/~bonica/papers/bonica_ajps_mimp_2014.pdf.
106

26

roll-call votes). However, they still correlate well with DW-nominate scores and have some
unique advantages.
On a basic level, CF-scores are very similar to DW-nominate scores: For data going back
to 1980, Democrat scores tend to run between -2 and 1, while Republican scores run between -1
and 2, though in 2018, a clear divide existed between the two parties in fundraising scores. I
show this in Figures A.1 and A.2 below. The sets of scores also operate on slightly different
scales, but ultimately we get a strong linear relationship between them, with a change of 1 point
in contributor CF-score corresponding to a change of approximately 0.43 points in DW-nominate
score, and a coefficient of determination (R2) of 0.83, suggesting that 83% of change in CF-score
could be explained by the variation in DW-nominate score.
This result should not be surprising due to issue constraint, the correlation between
preferences across issues. For example, as Keith Poole noted in 2005, “in contemporary
American politics the knowledge that a politician opposes raising the minimum wage makes it
virtually certain that she opposes universal health care, opposes affirmative action, … In short,
that she is a conservative and almost certainly a Republican.”107 Based on a politician’s party
identification and their stance on one or two specific issues, a donor can then guess the
remaining issue positions of a candidate, which would then reflect itself in an eventual Nominate
score (for those who win). While they may be different from the typical political donor, many
ideologically-focused PACs demonstrate how donations can be used to discern ideological
differences between members of the same party. On the Republican side, we should expect a
candidate supported by the Council for Citizens Against Government Waste to be more
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conservative than a candidate funded by the Main Street PAC108, named for a more moderate
faction of the party. On the Democratic side, candidates supported by the Blue Dog Democrats
will be more moderate, and (due to issue constraint) we might expect the same for anyone
accepting money from the NRA.
An important aspect of Nominate scores that is often ignored is how issues that come up
for votes more often end up affecting scores more than issues that come up once or never.109 Due
to issue constraint, the correlation of political preferences across issues, we should not expect
that to impact scores too much, but CF-scores have an advantage in reflecting issues more
prominent in campaign rhetoric than in the halls of Congress. As Bonica notes, issues like
abortion and the rights of same-sex couples “feature prominently in campaign rhetoric and are a
frequent subject of ballot initiatives” but “in any given Congress it is rare to see more than a
dozen roll call votes” on those specific issues.110 However, without knowledge of the predictive
space (the original issue positions) and the weights given to specific issues, it’s difficult to make
a direct comparison between measures of ideology.111 The CF-scores also perform well as a
predictive measure; however, as Bonica was able to use fundraising information in a machine
learning model to predict future DW-nominate scores just as accurately as Nokken-Poole
estimates, which use roll call votes from a legislator’s first two-year Congressional term.112 In
addition, CFscores are considered significant, even when controlling for party, when used to
model responses to a set of 19 CCES policy items.113 Similarly, in a separate paper Bonica also
found that CF-scores predict roll call votes at a rate just 1% worse (0.928 vs. 0.938) than DW-
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nominate scores (which are already pulled from those same roll call votes), though using party
ID alone led to 91.8% accuracy.114

Figure 1a: DW-Nominate vs. CFscores, 1980-2018

Figure 1b: DW-Nominate vs. CFscores, 2018
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Chapter 2: The Factors Influencing Small Donations
Small donations are primed to play a substantial role in the 2022 or 2024 federal
campaign cycles, though the level of their importance heavily depends on the legislative outcome
of the public financing provisions of H.R. 1, the For the People Act. H.R. 1 was passed originally
by the House of Representatives in 2019, and was passed again in March 2021.115 Under Title V
of the Act, candidates can receive $6 in public funds for every dollar they receive in small
campaign contributions,116 with two major stipulations: First, candidates cannot receive more
than $1,000 from any individual donor, and second, candidates must refund any contributions
that exceed the $200 “small donor” cap if they used funding from the specific donor to receive
public matching.117 Importantly, there is no language restricting the matching funds to donations
from the same state or district as the candidate, allowing larger donors to behave more
strategically by spreading money across more candidates, but also allowing small donors to play
a significant role in races in which they cannot vote. The 2019 draft of H.R. 1 also includes a
three-state118 pilot program for $25 campaign finance vouchers to be distributed to all voting-age
residents who are not otherwise ineligible to make campaign contributions.119
Money isn’t everything; sometimes it won’t make a difference, and other times it won’t
be needed. Michael Bloomberg ultimately won just 44 delegates in his quest to be the
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Democratic nominee for President in 2020,120 while Dave Brat successfully primaried House
Majority Leader Eric Cantor despite spending just $206,000 in 2014.121 However, if fundraising,
or small donations more specifically, has a positive impact on electoral success, then increases in
the share of small donations in campaign finance will cause Congress to have more politicians
who better attract small donations. Understanding who is more likely to benefit from increased
small donations can help predict possible consequences of H.R. 1, or from any increase in the
share of small donations in campaign finance.
Small donations have been shown to go towards more ideologically-extreme candidates
when compared to their “large” counterparts. In a 2019 study of small donations in 2006-2010
U.S. House elections, Tyler Culberson, Michael McDonald, and Suzanne Robbins found that the
most ideologically extreme incumbents raised $306,557 more than the most moderate
incumbents.122 Such a finding fits with the profile of the “typical” political donor. While most of
the 30 largest donors have CFscores123 more-moderate than the party averages,124 the distribution
of all donors against self-described ideology is bimodal.125 Meanwhile, both Republican126 and
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Democratic donors127 are more likely to contribute to candidates if they view the opposing party
as more extreme or unfavorable. Not only are more-extreme individuals more likely to
contribute, but they weight a candidate’s ideology more heavily than possible access or party
control of government when deciding to donate.128 This is further corroborated by the
relationship between business interests and election winners. 80-90% of corporate PAC money
goes to those election winners, compared to 48-55% of small donations,129 and, as a partial
consequence, challengers raise 21% of their campaign cash from small donors compared to 7%
for incumbents.130 The egalitarian spread of small donations compared to the concentration of
corporate money must be caused by differing motivations amongst donors. Expanding the impact
of existing small donations may then be less healthy for our political system than encouraging
new, more moderate donors to give to candidates, such as through H.R. 1’s proposed voucher
program.
There are also benefits to increasing the role of small donations in campaign finance.
Under our current campaign finance system, former Representatives have been candid with
quotes like “money changed votes.”131 Even when money is not exchanged with the implication
of support on a specific issue, politicians hear more about issues faced by the wealthy and
specific interest groups when raising money from lobbyists and through “call time.” Members of
Congress spend anywhere from 30-70 percent of their time fundraising,132 something Rodney

Richard H. Pildes, “Participation and Polarization,” University of Pennsylvania Journal of Constitutional Law 22,
no. 2 (2020): 386.
128
Pildes, “Participation and Polarization,” 384.
129
Laurent Bouton, Micael Castanheira, and Allan Drazen, “A Theory of Small Campaign Contributions,” NBER
Working Paper 24413, National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, MA: 13.
130
Pildes, “Participation and Polarization,” 978.
131
Joe Scarborough, from: Lawrence Lessig, Republic, Lost. (New York: Hachette Book Group, 2015): 133.
132
Ibid, 138-139.
127

32

Alexander called “not fair for the member, not fair for constituency.”133 Ultimately, a member of
Congress is not going to spend half an hour on the phone with a $100 donor, but they are likely
to spend that much time, or longer, with a lobbyist or max donor. One person and their spouse
can give over $10,000 to a candidate for an election cycle, while a lobbyist can “bundle”134
contributions from multiple sources. Members of Congress and other candidates who take
advantage of public matching would not have the same need to get on the phone and may be
encouraged to cater more towards their larger base of supporters than to large donors and special
interests. At the bare minimum, a public funding system can work to undermine the charge that
that special interests drive legislative and executive policy. Concerns can of course be raised
about the profiles of smaller donors, but when compared to the 15,810 people who accounted for
half of all contributions in 2016, the issues they face should be more representative of those
faced by the average American.135
Study, Data, and Methodology
The analysis in this chapter will focus on the connection between several candidate and
electoral factors and small donations received. The particular interest is candidate ideology, but
because donations can also be influenced by candidate factors like gender and experience, or
district factors like competitiveness and income, their relationships can also be quantified by a
multivariate model in which they are included as controlling factors.136 I also control for the
amount a candidate receives in large donations, as a proxy for candidate popularity, since those
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candidates should receive larger dollar amounts of both large and small donations, whether due
to specific charismatic qualities or the nature of their race. The relationship between these
variables will be explained by a linear model run in R software.
Data on fundraising was acquired from the Federal Election Commission’s candidate
summary files,137 one of which is available for each election cycle. The FEC also publishes
election results in separate files for House and Senate elections, for both primary and general
elections. This study focuses on general elections, though donations large and small may have a
larger impact in the primary cycle, when candidates attempt to show viability, establish name
recognition, and turn out the vote – all issues that are lessened in a longer campaign that ends on
Election Day.
Most other data, including candidate ideology scores (DW-Nominate and CFscores),
were acquired from Adam Bonica’s Database on Ideology, Money in Politics, and Elections
(DIME). Candidates in the DIME dataset can be matched to their fundraising and election results
in FEC data through the use of their candidate IDs, 9-digit alphanumeric codes that begin with
“H” or “S” depending on the office, and whose 3rd and 4th letters are the state postal code. I am
also using Bonica’s dataset for candidate gender and Democratic Presidential vote share, a proxy
for district partisanship. The dataset includes election results, though not for 2018, and
incumbency status, though there appear to be some errors where challengers (running against
incumbents) are sometimes labeled as running for open seats, and vice versa.
I have coded candidates as challengers or as running for an open seat using the JacobsonCarson Codebook, which also indicates whether candidates have previously run for elected
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office, which is a common measure of candidate quality. A more specific coding of the highest
office held by a candidate would be useful, though it is not available for this study. In a study by
David Lublin, former U.S. Representatives, Governors, and lesser state officials on average
received at least 5% more of the vote, compared to 1% more for state legislators, in comparison
to inexperienced candidates.138
Median district income was acquired from Adam Isacson’s data on the 116th Congress.139
I will be using the 2018 income data for 2016, 2018, and 2020, as the economic health of a
region is likely not to have changed significantly in either two-year gap. Even though donors can
contribute to federal candidates from any state, we should still expect donors to show a degree of
favoritism towards local candidates, who might be more liked and better-known. As such,
candidates from wealthier districts should receive more large and small donations than
candidates from poorer districts.
Some factors cannot be controlled for in the model. A candidate can seek small donations
as part of their political strategy. Small donations can be acquired for “free” (simply from
existing supporters seeking to contribute through a candidate’s website, or as a consequence of
cost-lite measures like email blasts), but they can also be encouraged by digital advertisements,
promotional materials, and media appearances, all of which come at the expense of either money
or time. Using data on digital advertising would help account for strategy differences, though
such data are limited in scope (and can only be used for partial tests; I explore such data later in
Chapter 2 and again in Chapter 3).
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The linear models in this chapter and Chapter 3 use R’s lm() function, which uses the
ordinary least squares method of linear regression analysis. The multiple linear regression
predicts the dependent variable (in this chapter, that will generally be total small donations) as a
combination of linear functions of each independent variable or control. Regression aims to
minimize the difference between the actual and expected values of the dependent variable for
each set of independent variable inputs. Ordinary least squares (OLS) will find the minimum
sum of squares of the difference between those actual and expected values, rather than
minimizing just the sum of the direct difference between values.

Results and Analysis
Using data from the DIME database and FEC data, Figure 1 displays trends in small
contributions since 1980, the first election cycle for which Bonica displays data. Despite
disclosure requirements not changing in in that timespan, small donations gradually crept
upwards from 1980 to 2016, though there was no direct trend, with the 1982 “peak” in donations
remaining unmatched until 2006. The level of donations may indicate a certain amount of
interest in an election cycle, given the motivations and partisanship of most small donors, but
economic changes do not appear to have had a major impact on the number of dollars spent. It’s
possible that this consistency in the total amount of small donations comes from decreases in the
total number of small donors that would come from some donors moving over the cap from one
cycle to another then being “cancelled out” by other, smaller donors increasing their still-small
donations.
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Data for 2018 and 2020 acquired from the FEC.

Figure 1, but with 2018 and 2020 ommitted, to better show cycle-to-cycle fluctuation

Small donations as a proportion of total receipts across all Congressional candidates
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It may be more helpful, though, to examine the share of small donations in election
cycles, as there exist longer-term trends on increases in campaign spending.140 Figure 2
demonstrates that the proportion of small donations as a share of total funding, not just individual
contributions, of federal campaigns decreased from 1980 to 2008, but has risen sharply in the
two most recent cycles. Ultimately, the causes behind the increase in other forms of contributions
over time and the sudden shift against small contributions in the mid-1980s are beyond the scope
of this paper, but only now is the increase in small donations outpacing corresponding increases
in other contributions.
The substantial changes in small donations in the 2018 and 2020 cycles are likely related
to the increasing prominence of the online fundraising platforms ActBlue and WinRed. On these
sites, candidates create accounts and donation forms, and individuals are then able to access
those online forms to contribute using electronic payment methods like credit cards. The sites
then pass on the money to the candidate (as an individual contribution, they are not PACs) and
report the contribution to the FEC. ActBlue has been registered with the FEC since 2004, but in
2016 it processed just $679 million in donations compared to $1.2 billion in 2018 and an
astounding $4 billion in 2020,141 albeit a year with a very crowded Democratic Presidential field.
WinRed, meanwhile, processed $1.8 billion in 2020, its first election cycle.142 While online
platforms make contributing to a candidate easier, it’s unlikely that ease of access is entirely
responsible for this shift. Candidates may have become better at leveraging digital advertising
and social media to encourage online donations, and it’s possible that the Trump presidency has
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fueled a level of voter interest and partisan animosity not present during or prior to his 2016
election.

2018 and 2020 again omitted to better display prior years. Democratic and Republican figures for 2014 are heavily
overlapping.

Figure 3 breaks out the totals by party. Since 2002, Democrats have consistently
outpaced their Republican rivals in generating small donations, though the Republican haul of
$155 million in 2010 was the highest total for either party prior to 2018’s wave election. Most
importantly, neither party held a significant year-to-year advantage prior to 2016. Democrats
won a “wave election” in 2018 with a small donation fundraising gap of nearly $250 million.
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That gap was roughly the same $250 million in 2020, but the increases in both totals meant
Republicans did comparatively better in 2020 by raising 63% of the Democratic total compared
to a pitiful 31% in 2018. Of course, Democrats did not do as well electorally with a smaller
advantage in 2016. Still, it would be difficult to refute the premise that partisan enthusiasm,
perhaps facilitated by campaigns and online platforms, drove the recent outliers in 2010 and
2018-2020.
Variable Relationships and Model Results

Both U.S. House and Senate candidates included.

Figure 4 graphs ideology and small donations for 2016 and 2018. The results do not
indicate a linear relationship between the two variables, as fundraising totals follow more of a
“bell curve.” None of the high fund-raising totals are from candidates with a CFscore greater
than 2. More broadly, this demonstrates how large totals of small donations tend to come from
outliers who raise significantly more than their peers. 18 candidates (of 1,597) in the data set
raised over $5 million from small donors, 14 of them in 2018, and raised a combined total of
$137 million from small donations, 28% of the total for all the candidates.
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2016-2018. District partisanship calculated from the difference between Democratic and Republican shares of the
two-party vote (third-party votes excluded) in the 2016 Presidential election. Both House and Senate candidates
included.

It is possible that less partisan districts, which should attract more competitive races and
encourage donors to spend, also have more moderate nominees who can be more “competitive”
and better appeal to swing voters or the opposing party. This would suggest a positive
relationship between district partisanship and candidate ideology. As Figure 5 shows, though, for
general election candidates in 2016 and 2018, such a relationship is not readily apparent. As
always there are very few candidates with CFscores above 2, but more of them come from
competitive districts than from safe seats. Indeed, we find a negative relationship, suggesting that
increased district partisanship leads to less extreme candidates. The correlation is statistically
significant, but a near-zero R-squared value of 0.02 suggests the substantive effect is very small.
Modeling a direct linear relationship between unitemized donation totals,143 those under
$200, and candidate extremism from 1980-2018, with the latter variable measured as the
absolute value of CFscore, gives a highly significant relationship with a p-value of less than
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0.001 and a coefficient of 19,330, meaning a candidate with a CFscore of 1 or -1 will on average
receive $19,330 more in small donations than a candidate with a CFscore of 0. The R-squared
value for this relationship, however, is less than 0.001, suggesting that the variation in small
donations remains unexplained.
Much of this issue comes from the changing levels of small donations over time. When
$120 million in small donations is split across several thousand candidates, many candidates,
including primary winners, can report only a few thousand dollars in unitemized totals.
Meanwhile, Beto O’Rourke reported over $30 million in small donations in 2018. The
correlation between the small donation totals and CFscores can be attributed to the gradual
disappearance of candidates with CFscores close to 0,144 and the gradual rise in small donations.
Ultimately, even removing the outlying 2018 data and analyzing candidates with a minimum of
$10,000 raised from small donations does not strengthen the explanatory value past 0.01.
A multivariate model produces a better “fit.” Using data from the 2016 and 2018 U.S.
House elections, itemized individual donations, candidate ideology, and district partisanship all
demonstrate strong significance in determining a candidate’s level of small donations, while
candidate gender and district median income have a weaker but still-significant correlation. See
Table 1. Whether a candidate has held prior office is just not strong enough despite a t-score of 1.7 (see rightmost column of Table 1). Surprisingly, candidates only receive a predicted extra
$100,000 to $250,000 from a one-point increase on the CFscore index; the most extreme
Democratic and Republican incumbents, Bernie Sanders and Jody Hice, have CFscores of -1.828
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and 1.482, respectively. Candidates raise less in small donations if they come from a wealthier
district, less if they’ve held prior office, and less if they run in a more-competitive district.
Controlling for the number of large donations makes the total receipts a candidate
receives from small donations more significant, and it suggests that experienced candidates from
wealthier, more-competitive areas may also just have an advantage in fundraising from large
donors. Existing members of Congress do use “call time,” and donors looking for influence
would certainly want to give to candidates winning non-competitive races, but also competitive
challengers over less-competitive ones. The direction of median income also indicates that while
wealthier districts will have more potential donors, district income may correlate more with the
amount of donations rather than the number of donors.
Table 1: Predicting Small Donations
Variables
Candidate CFscore
Candidate Gender
(Male)
Held Elected Office?
(Yes)
Party (Republican)
Controls
Itemized Indiv.
Contributions
Median District
Income
District Partisanship
House or Senate?
R2
Degrees of Freedom

All 16-18
Candidates
1.862
(.000)
-0.9834
(.007)

0.4056
(.000)
-1.383
(.157)
4.178
(.016)
Both
0.6278
1533

Major Party
Candidates
1.893
(.000)
-0.7451
(.050)

Major Party,
2018
2.186
(.000)
-0.3156
(.595)

-0.7238
(.0277)

-0.4014
(.456)

0.4044
(.000)
-1.435
(.145)
3.838
(.030)
Both
0.6288
1520

0.4746
(.000)
-1.132
(.480)
9.390
(.001)
Both
0.6694
777

U.S. House only
1.099
(.000)
-0.4422
(.033)
-0.2730
(.145)

0.3288
(.000)
-1.150
(.036)
1.817
(.065)
House
.4361
1396

Estimates from linear regression models. Entries are unstandardized coefficient estimates with p-values in
parentheses. Dollar totals for independent and dependent variables are in the hundred thousands.
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A similar relationship is demonstrated in the model that excludes holding prior office,
which allows for the inclusion of U.S. Senators and their opponents. There are slightly higher
coefficients for all variables, though none change direction and all except median income stay
significant. The relationship between candidate gender and fundraising becomes very significant,
with female candidates raising $95,000 more than their equivalent male colleagues. This
relationship was still significant, though smaller, with prior office included, which accounts for
attempts to recruit “better” female candidates. Organizations like EMILY’s List could potentially
play a role in the fundraising success of these candidates, though they only support pro-choice
Democratic candidates and there is no clear Republican equivalent. There is also no significant
relationship when only 2018 Democratic House candidates are considered, so Republicans likely
play an important role in the connection between gender and fundraising from small
donations.145
The primary factor driving small donations in these models, though, is large donations.
Candidates can expect to receive 40 cents in small donations for every dollar in larger individual
contributions – an expected 28% share of individual contributions. Thus, a serious candidate who
raises $720,000 from larger individual contributions should on average receive $280,000 in small
donations. Removing these contributions from the model, meanwhile, decreases the R2 value to
just 0.02, while modeling a linear relationship between just large and small contributions for all
candidates gives roughly the same coefficient and an R2 value of 0.62. This indicates that the
reasons candidates receive large donations should ultimately be very similar to the reasons
candidates receive small donations. In particular, candidate name recognition is not included but
is likely significant in deciding who receives both small donations and some larger contributions.
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$200 may also not be a particularly good “dividing line” in terms of these donor motivations;
individuals looking for attention from a candidate will likely need to be closer to the ceiling of
$5,000 per “donation.” Donors in the $200-$1,000 range are likely wealthier than small donors,
but $50 and $100 contributors have to have a certain amount of disposable income or desire to
give.
Table 2: Predicting Small Donation Share
Variables
Candidate CFscore
Candidate Gender
(Male)
Held Elected
Office? (Yes)
Party (Republican)
Controls
Median District
Income ($100,000s)
District
Partisanship
R2
DF

All 16-18
Candidates
0.1642
(.000)
-0.0394
(.000)

0.02791
(.290)
-0.0397
(.379)
.1995
1513

Major Party
Candidates
0.1633
(.000)
-0.01457
(.141)

Major Party,
2018
0.1713
(.000)
-0.01696
(.208)

-0.07566
(.000)

-0.06611
(.000)

0.01810
(.483)
-0.09336
(0.036)
.2386
1502

0.02022
(.583)
-0.0093
(.880)
.2333
773

U.S. House only
0.1434
(.000)
-0.03642
(.000)
-0.06494
(.000)

0.03095
(.249)
0.0079
(.865)
.222
1377

Dependent variable changed to small donations as a share of total donations. Estimates from linear regression
models. Entries are unstandardized coefficient estimates with p-values in parentheses.

To test this further, I analyzed the same data while changing the dependent variable to be
a candidate’s share of small donations received. The explanatory variables have somewhat weak
effects, which makes sense when all sorts of candidates can end up with a low share of small
donations, muddling at least part of the picture. Despite this, ideology has a statistically
significant effect, with one point in CFscore suggesting that a candidate’s share of small
donations is 14-17 percentage points higher.

45

Moving beyond ideology, a candidate’s share of small donations is only weakly related to
district partisanship and insignificantly related to median income. The weak effect from district
partisanship (shown in Figure 6) is more confusing, as the results from modeling small donation
totals suggested that candidates in less-competitive districts received more small donations when
controlling for larger donations. Figure 7 shows that perhaps that effect was driven by some
outlying cases.

Figure 6: Share of Small Donations and District Partisanship and Income, 2018

Figure 7: Total Small Donations and District Partisanship and Income, 2018

More specifically, Figures 6-7 explore the relationship by plotting median income and
district partisanship against a candidate’s share of small donations and a candidate’s total small
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(unitemized) contributions. There appears to be a slight negative relationship for district
partisanship, with most candidates who raised 50% of their funds from small contributions
competing in less-partisan districts.
Narrowing the data to more “serious” candidates may provide greater insight, but the
challenge may also lie in the difficulty of deciding how to structure the model. Modeling small
donations by controlling for “large” donations provides more explanatory power, and this
suggests that the causes of small donation totals are similar to the ones for larger donations. On
the other hand, modeling the share of donations should pick up the differential effect of various
factors on small donation fundraising. For example, more-minor candidates can raise virtually
any share of their total contributions in small donations, if they are not raising a large total.
Ultimately, if a variable or control is significant for both types of measurements (total versus
share), we can be confident in its importance.
Returning to a sum as the dependent variable, the strongest model in Table 1 comes from
controlling for the Democratic Party’s 2018 surge in donations by restricting the year to 2018
and adding a party variable.146 For 2018 major-party candidates, party is still insignificant,
probably because the surge in small donations didn’t reach all Democrats, though the direction is
correctly against Republicans and suggests Democrats raised $25,000 more than comparable
Republicans. The coefficient for ideology is raised to $247,000 for 1 point in CFscore, at that
point marking a spread of over $400,000 between the most moderate Democratic incumbents and
Sanders. Gender also becomes insignificant when party is included, so there may be a
relationship between gender and party that leads to better (or worse) fundraising for a subset of
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candidates. District partisanship also becomes a much stronger factor, now suggesting candidates
from the most extreme districts (PVI of +50) raise over $500,000 more in small donations than
candidates from the most even districts.
Incumbents do not actually raise substantially more from individuals than the typical
general election challenger, though in this entire discussion I’ve excluded challengers who
receive fewer than 10 percent of the vote. Incumbents in 2016 and 2018 raised $1,471,518 from
individuals on average, with $1,161,319 coming from itemized contributions and $310,199
coming from unitemized (small) contributions, a 21% share. Challengers, meanwhile, raised
$1,276,750, with $954,614 from itemized contributions and $322,135 from unitemized
contributions, a 25% share. The entire difference in fundraising comes from the difference in
large donations, indicating that incumbents are more popular with large donors relative to their
popularity with small donors, though this does not indicate specifically whether incumbents are
more popular with large donors or challengers are more popular with small donors.
There are several possible explanations for the relatively-small overall difference in
average fundraising between challengers and incumbents: First, parties performing better in the
national environment likely have an enthusiasm and fundraising advantage, and can spend more
heavily on challengers running in competitive races. Second, incumbents in “safe” districts may
not need to raise much more than challengers, because they are virtually assured reelection by
winning their primary. Third, challengers often need to “overcome” any advantages of
incumbency (the incumbent is a proven winner whom voters are already familiar with), which
would require spending more. Finally, incumbents are also able to rely on PACs, which are not
measured here.
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Table 3: Incumbency Status and Small-Dollar Fundraising (2016-2018)
Variables
Candidate CFscore
Candidate Gender
(Male)
Party (Republican)
Controls
Itemized Indiv.
Contributions
Median District
Income
District
Partisanship
R2
DF

Major Party
Incumbents
4.673
(.000)
-1.433
(.038)
-1.176
(.047)

Major Party
Non-Incumbents
0.9273
(.011)
-1.004
(.802)
-7.895
(.040)

0.4201
(.000)
-3.423
(.034)
6.347
(.027)
.6041
756

0.3786
(.000)
-0.7275
(.530)
-1.064
(.626)
.6861
757

Estimates from linear regression models. Entries are unstandardized coefficient estimates with p-values in
parentheses. Dollar totals again in the hundred thousands for independent and dependent variables.

The results in Table 3 look at incumbents and challengers separately. Incumbents follow
a pattern more similar to the earlier models, with an even-stronger coefficient of $470,000 for
every point in CFscore in Table 3. There is a much stronger relationship between small donations
and district partisanship, and gender has a significant effect on fundraising. One wouldn’t
necessarily expect female incumbents to raise more than their male colleagues, since any desire
to support greater gender equality in Congress, or any inherent electoral advantage women have,
could be rendered largely irrelevant when only incumbents are compared. Individuals interested
in getting more women in Congress should be more likely to contribute to female challengers.
This makes the significance of gender on small donations difficult to explain. The difference of
about $700,000 (using the left column of table 3) between the most moderate and extreme
incumbents, based on about 1.5 units of CFscore, is much larger than Culberson et al.’s finding
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of $300,000 between those poles in 2006-2010,147 but follows from the substantial increase in
small donations in 2018.
However, challengers act much differently than incumbents. Gender, district partisanship,
and median income are not significant. Ideology still has a significant relationship, though less
than with incumbents, and a much lower coefficient of $93,000. Since this model only considers
general election candidates, it is likely that more extreme challengers also have a lower chance of
unseating incumbents, which should negatively affect their ability to raise money.
Reviewing Outliers
As previously stated, 18 candidates who raised over $5 million in small donations
combined for 28% of all small donations received among 2016 and 2018 candidates. As Figure 8
will show, no candidate was expected to raise more than $1 million from small donations.
Knowledge of what candidates significantly outperform their expected totals, some of whom
faced competitive elections but some of whom did not, is helpful in terms of understanding what
other factors might drive small donations.
Rather predictably, the candidates with the largest residuals, or the difference between
their actual fundraising total and the fundraising total expected from the model, tend to be
Democrats running in 2018 or Senate candidates more broadly; other than Devin Nunes, the 10
candidates with the largest residuals are all Senators, mostly incumbents, with CFscores
generally in the 1-2 (or -1 to -2) range, excepting Florida Senator Bill Nelson, who lost to former
Governor Rick Scott in 2018, who had a score of 0.75.

Tyler Culberson, Michael P. McDonald, and Suzanne M. Robbins, “Small Donors in Congressional Elections,”
American Politics Research 47, no. 5 (2019): 984.
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Table 4: Outlying Candidates in Small Donations Received
Candidate

CFscore

Elizabeth Warren

Raised Above
Expected ($)
12,938,357

Rafael “Ted” Cruz

11,441,166

1.391

Heidi Heitkamp

10,932,091

-1.154

Claire McCaskill

10,688,470

-1.254

Russell Feingold

9,404,377

-1.358

Jacky Rosen

7,922,632

-1.411

Bernard Sanders

7,826,411

-1.828

Bill Nelson

6,721,667

-0.750

Devin Nunes

6,145,063

1.083

Catherine CortezMasto

5,876,525

-1.470

-1.525

The list is full of recognizable names: Except for the current, Nevada Senate delegation,
those 10 were all incumbents or former incumbents (Russ Feingold lost his Wisconsin seat in
2010 and ran for it again in 2018). Nelson, Heidi Heitkamp, Claire McCaskill, and Ted Cruz
were all defending competitive seats, while Feingold, Rosen, and Cortez-Masto were challenging
for them. The outliers who did not face competitive races are Warren, Sanders, and Nunes, the
former two known for supporting policies like a “wealth tax,” while Nunes chaired the House
Intelligence Committee from 2015-2019, giving him prominence from investigations into Hillary
Clinton and possible anti-Trump activity. Overall, name recognition or identification of
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promising challengers/vulnerable incumbents seems to play a large role in the fundraising
success of these “top 10” candidates.148
Figure 8: Expected Small Donations vs. Actual

Online Fundraising Strategies
No data exists to effectively measure candidate strategy (i.e., an explicit target of small
donors over large donors) and include it in a model. Candidates do not all have the same
fundraising or campaign strategy, both of which impact donations (one more directly than the
other). Incumbents may more easily rely on large contributors, particularly those with business
interests who may want to back a winner, while challengers may take several different
approaches, or try some combination of strategies (they often have much less time and

Candidates without a CFscore from the DIME dataset, including Beto O’Rourke, Ted Cruz’s Democratic
challenger from the 2018 Texas Senate race, have been excluded from the data and analysis. It is unclear why that
score is missing, as O’Rourke has run for office previously.
148
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experience) to gain financial support. While many elements of campaign and fundraising
strategy (events, emails, phone calls) are difficult or impossible to measure on a macro level,
many candidates advertise digitally and include fundraising links in those advertisements (often
with an explicit ask for contributions). Thus, candidates who spend more on digital advertising,
generally on social media, may receive a larger share of small contributions than those who
spend less.
Facebook publishes information about political spending on the “Report” page of its Ad
Library.149 The published information includes a page name, amount spent in a given period, and
the number of ads in the Library. Facebook’s data runs back to May 2018, but does not allow for
selections of specific date windows for which that information can be pulled. To explore any
relationship between Facebook spending and small donations, I pulled data from October 2020 to
January 2021, and applied it to 2016 and 2018 candidates who were again running in 2020 (Jon
Ossoff was excluded), as well as running a bivariate model analyzing just Facebook spending
and small donor fundraising for only 2020 candidates. For those 2020 candidates, Facebook
spending has a significant (p < .001), positive relationship with their share of small donations
received, but that relationship becomes negative and insignificant (p = 0.44) when total
fundraising is included as a control.150 This relationship stays insignificant (p = 0.47) for the
subset of 2016 & 2018 candidates, though it is nearly significant when the dependent variable is
small donations as a proportion of total funding received. Candidates who raise more money may
receive more in small donations and spend more on Facebook advertising, but it does not appear

149
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https://www.facebook.com/ads/library/report/.
Those results are not shown.
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that Facebook spending and small donations are themselves related (at least with the limited data
I can gather on digital ad spending).
On the other hand, Facebook spending does decrease the correlation between ideology,
gender, and a candidate’s aggregate small donations raised (comparing Table 5 to Table 2, which
does not incorporate Facebook spending). Facebook spending does not have any sort of direct
relationship with those donations once fundraising is included as a control, but if more
ideologically-extreme candidates are more likely to advertise digitally and to raise money from
small donations, that would weaken the direct relationship between ideology and small donations
in the model. There may in fact be a degree of weakness in the direct relationship between
ideology and small donations, but it should be explored in-depth with data all from the same time
period (as it stands, DIME scores are not available for 2020 candidates, nor are official vote
totals from the FEC).
Table 5: Facebook Spending and Small-Dollar Fundraising
Variables
Candidate CFscore
Candidate Gender
(Male)
Facebook Spending
Controls
Itemized Indiv.
Contributions
Median District
Income
District
Partisanship
R2
DF

Fundraising
Share
0.1282
(.000)
-0.05351
(.000)
0.2159
(.010)

Aggregate
Fundraising ($)
0.1644
(.180)
-0.1269
(.176)
0.6349
(.467)

0.4314
(.283)
-0.1753
(.014)
.2082
368

0.4460
(.000)
-2.266
(.387)
7.029
(.134)
.5006
367

Estimates from linear regression models. Entries are unstandardized coefficient estimates with p-values in
parentheses. Dollar values in the millions.
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Importance of Results and Need for Further Investigation
In addition to the dominant factor of larger individual contributions, candidate ideology is
significant in determining their level of small donations received in all but the final model. The
difference between the most moderate and extreme incumbents leads to an additional $250,000
to $450,000 in small donations. This may have to do with the “base” of party candidates being
just above a CFscore of 1, though outlier candidates like Elizabeth Warren and Bernie Sanders
undoubtedly push the model in that direction as well. If the model accurately represents the
relationship between ideology and small donations, though, more extreme candidates already
have a substantial fundraising advantage that could be doubled, tripled, or quadrupled by the
public matching provisions of H.R.1: A theoretical candidate who receives all their money in
public funding can increase their take seven-fold, but all candidates face some sort of trade-off
between public funding and lower caps on donations. Whether this difference will actually give
candidates an electoral advantage remains to be seen, but any advantage would be most
prominent in primaries, due to presumed decreasing returns to scale on dollars spent, between
more-moderate and more-extreme candidates.
If a connection exists, though, it may be helpful in keeping members of Congress directly
accountable to voters, though those voters would often just be the loudest, most active, and
extreme voices. Primary challenges fueled by extremist party wings could substantially increase
gridlock in Congress or turn off more-moderate citizens from becoming involved in the political
sphere. This assumes that polarization leading to less bipartisan action in Congress is a negative,
but individual readers will all have their own opinions. The graphs included n the Appendix to
Chapter 1 do demonstrate that even though Republican members of Congress who ran for office
in 2018 were slightly more off-center than their Democratic counterparts, but both parties have
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drifted away from one another. CFscores are better at demonstrating how candidates compare to
one another than to a body of issues, but it is fair to say small donations help more-extreme
candidates in both parties.
Finance vouchers then become a superior reform when compared to donor matching,
with the hope that getting new donors involved in the financing process leads to less-extreme
candidates or at least offsets giving partisans more money to donate. On the other hand, the stillinexplicable connection between female candidates and small donations could portend a
somewhat-easier road to a gender-balanced Congress, an end result that may not necessarily have
a real impact, but may help half the population see themselves reflected in Congress.
Understanding what types of candidates receive small donations is crucial to discerning
the benefits and downsides of some “democratizations” of campaign finance. While this model
clearly demonstrates how more ideologically-extreme candidates benefit from small donations,
modeling the relationship still leads to several questions for further research. There exist both
benefits and downsides to examining a candidate’s aggregate total of small donations, or viewing
it as a share of a total, though using both to determine significance is a possible solution. On the
other hand, the incorporation of Facebook spending into a smaller sample suggests strategy
influences the relationship between ideology and small donations, though why it does is thus far
unclear when Facebook spending itself is not correlated with increased small donations. A
deeper understanding of this relationship with Facebook spending or digital advertising more
broadly will be helpful in better understanding the connection between ideology and
contributions, even if its significance is not surprising when considering the typical donor
profile.
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Chapter 3: Small Donations, Fundraising, and Votes
Ultimately, the impact of ideology and other specific candidate traits on fundraising from
small donations, as found in the second chapter, is irrelevant unless those traits or that
fundraising also impacts how well a candidate performs in a primary or general election. From
the median voter theorem,151 candidates who are closer to the center ideologically should attract
more votes than candidates who are more extreme, even if more-extreme candidates are more
successful with small donors (who are themselves more extreme than the population as a whole).
Candidate experience (holding prior elected office), meanwhile, correlates with 1 to 7 percentage
point gain in vote share depending on the office.152 We would expect those advantages for
experienced candidates to decrease as the number of cross-pressured and “persuadable” voters
decreases from social sorting153 and increased partisanship. As for gender, a more-recent study
by Cecilia Hyunjung Mo found that individuals chose the “strong” female candidate 56% of the
time when presented with a choice between that candidate and a “strong” male candidate,154 a
finding that would be in line with some fundraising models suggesting female candidates were
more popular with small donors.
However, there is a long-unresolved question of whether spending money ultimately
leads candidates to greater electoral success. Recent history of campaigns is littered with high
spenders who ultimately flamed out, whether it was Michael Bloomberg and Tom Steyer in the

David Henderson, “Don’t Ignore the Median Voter Theorem,” The Library of Economics and Liberty, October
19, 2019, https://www.econlib.org/dont-ignore-the-median-voter-theorem/.
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In which members of political parties begin to look more homogeneous, living in the same communities, coming
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Cecilia Hyunjung Mo, “The Consequences of Explicit and Implicit Gender Attitudes and Candidate Quality in
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2020 Democratic Presidential Primary or Sara Gideon in the 2020 Maine Senate election, where
Gideon raised $75 million (spending only $63 million) to Susan Collins’s $30 million,155 only to
finish with an 8-point loss.156 On the end of the spectrum, Dave Brat successfully primaried
House Majority Leader Eric Cantor in 2014 despite Cantor “spending more at steakhouses” than
Brat spent on his entire primary campaign (he raised all of $200,000).157 Of course, in many
competitive races the candidate who spends more money wins,158 but it is hardly a guarantee.
General studies of campaign spending and election outcome have found a confusing mix
of results for this relationship. Steven Levitt159 found that an extra $100,000 in spending led to
just a 0.33% increase in vote share. His study was from 1994, when $100,000 in spending was
still large; moreover, the estimated effect was not statistically significant.160 Further, controlling
for candidate quality and district fixed effects lowered the estimated effect by 90%.161 Overall,
researchers have been unable to tie incumbent spending in the House to increased electoral
success, though spending has been shown as beneficial to Senate candidates and House
challengers.162

OpenSecrets.org, “Maine Senate 2020 Race” (web page), Center for Responsive Politics (website), accessed
April 17, 2021, https://www.opensecrets.org/races/summary?cycle=2020&id=MES2.
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However, there are seemingly tangible benefits to raising more in campaign
contributions. Candidates can use that money to advertise in print, on the air, and over the
internet, and to put themselves or other campaign representatives (whether paid employees,
volunteers, political allies, or other members of a ticket) in front of voters. In these appearances,
candidates focus on convincing persuadable voters to back them in an election and convince their
supporters to turn out to vote. Most conventional wisdom on winning an election focuses on the
former, though Rachel Bitecofer163 claims this “Chuck Todd theory of American politics” should
be replaced by the idea that “What matters is what percentage of the electorate is Republican and
Republican leaners, and what percentage is Democratic and Democratic leaners, and how they
get activated.”164 Both sides would agree that the same exact electorate does not show up every
year, and that there is a share of that electorate that is persuadable, but the contention comes in
how many people that is: Bitecofer claims that it is only about 6% of the electorate, while Sam
Wang of the Princeton Election Commission claims it is roughly 10%.165 Either way, campaign
spending and the resulting spread of messages to voters should have an impact on the share or
number of votes a candidate receives.
Some academics argue, however, that campaign contact has little impact on the
electorate. In an analysis of 49 different field experiments studying the impact of campaign
contact and advertising, Joshua Kalla and David Broockman claim “the best estimate for the

While Bitecofer is not necessarily liked for her “Krassenstein Brothers approach for getting attention for her
forecasts,” referring to the tactic of replying to more popular posts on Twitter by offering a conflicting opinion, she
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persuasive effects of campaign contact and advertising…in general elections is zero.”166 In
particular, contact with individuals decays over time, making it ineffective before the lead-up to
election day, and persuasive contact close to election day is then ineffective even in the shortterm.167 The only cases in which messages are demonstrated to have persuasive effects are when
a candidate takes an unpopular position and “persuadable, cross-pressured voters”168 are properly
identified and targeted with communication focusing on that position.169 Importantly, messaging
also did not demonstrate any turnout effects among supporters,170 suggesting that no matter
whether electoral swings are caused by opinion changes or turnout changes, they do not come
from the persuasive outreach of campaigns (though specific “get out the vote” operations do
boost turnout171). Kalla and Broockman do note, though, that there may be effects from
candidate qualities, positions, or overall “message,” and from more-effective persuasion.172
There are several reasons why campaigns may have little to no effect on the eventual
outcome of the vote. A 1993 study by Gelman and King found that voters typically receive all
the information they choose to remember from the media and elsewhere, making it redundant
that they were also contacted with the same information by campaigns.173 Kalla and Broockman
then argue that the decreasing share of cross-pressured voters also decreases the number or type
of messages that can be shared to persuade voters,174 though it is unclear if this refers simply to a
lack of options for specific campaign outreach or the media more completely disseminating that
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information which could be used to sway persuadable voters. Voters are exposed to both sides of
competing arguments, and partisans have difficulty entertaining other ways of framing issues
than the position of their preferred party. So as Kalla and Broockman note, “contact from
campaigns in general elections could have effects early in the electoral cycle before the media
provides competing frames and relevant information, but that these effects would decay
rapidly.”175 Kalla and Broockman rule out the idea of “oversaturation” of information based on
their field study being the only door-to-door contact received by most of their sample.176
However, oversaturation is better expressed as coming from all forms of information, unless they
have reason to believe door-to-door contact is received differently from political advertising,
discourse with family and friends, and consumption of news and social media.
Of course, it can also be expected that candidates who raise more money will be more
successful even if spending doesn’t create increased support. While political donors are only a
small share of the electorate, support from donors suggests a level of popularity and “quality”
that is often difficult to measure but may be the mark of a talented candidate. The measure of
money received would not be as strong a measure of popularity as an aggregate total of
individual donors, but the smaller size of unitemized contributions should keep candidates in the
same ballpark. In addition, large donors who seek influence or access should be more likely to
target candidates who are favored to win; chapter 2 showed that incumbents raise a larger share
of their funds from large donors do than challengers. Based on this strategy, a healthy amount of
large donations should suggest that a challenger has a strong chance of unseating an incumbent.
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Another consideration for fundraising, spending, and campaign contact is the likelihood
of diminishing marginal returns for that activity. Introducing a new ad, voter script, or other
persuasive communication presents a new issue framing, thought, or piece of information that
can sway a voter, but constantly repeating established ideas may be less effective than the initial
establishment of that idea in the first place. Too many different ideas may be less effective than
hammering home a straightforward message that undecided voters remember on Election Day,
but the difference between running an ad 499 and 500 times is obviously less than the difference
between running it once and twice. This can lead to the idea of a “magic number” for
fundraising, after which additional dollars have a negative or neutral impact. Of course, Kalla
and Broockman appear to argue that diminishing marginal returns is not an issue because the
marginal returns are always close to zero, but this idea is worth exploring as a possibility.
Sara Gideon’s 2020 campaign for one of Maine’s Senate seats may be an example of
additional dollars having a negative impact on the outcome. The New York Times quoted a voter
calling the spending in the race “a slap in the face of America,” and the state head of Obama’s
campaigns called it “out of control.” Bill Green, a registered Democrat, appeared in pro-Collins
ads where he described “more than $40 million in false attacks against Susan Collins by out-ofstaters who don’t give a darn about Maine, and it’s shameful.”177 As that Obama campaign head
states, “when you have that much money, you’re throwing stuff at the wall.”178 Gideon still
ended the campaign with almost $15 million on hand.179 The content of Gideon’s campaign may
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have mattered just as much as the overspending, but that sort of financial advantage does lend
credence to allegations of attempting to “buy” an election.
On the other hand, financial strength has a demonstrated significance in primary
elections. Adam Bonica found that doubling a candidate’s fundraising total led to a 45 percent
increase in primary vote share, with both figures adjusted for the contest average.180 In addition,
primary candidates who display financial strength gain the idea of “electability” through the idea
that the many individuals or organizations backing them makes them more likely to defeat the
opposing candidate in the general election. This concept extends down to the seed stage; Hacker
and Pierson claim that candidates who fundraise well are supported by the DCCC or otherwise
“shut…out,” a process also emphasized by Rahm Emmanuel claiming “the first third of your
campaign is money, money, money.”181 The purpose of EMILY’s List, a PAC focused on female
candidates who support abortion rights, reinforces this idea, since its name is an acronym for
Early Money is Like Yeast (it makes the dough rise).182 Bonica has also argued that lawyers and
doctors are overrepresented in Congress because “even the most compelling candidates will
struggle to keep pace” if they don’t have a personal network that can provide them with an initial
infusion of cash.183 This increase may be a benefit of being able to spend more and expand a
campaign, but fundraising ability may also create that “electability” narrative.
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Modeling Candidate Success in General Elections
To analyze the relationship between fundraising and electoral success, I again leaned on
Adam Bonica’s Database on Ideology, Money in Politics, and Elections (DIME). The DIME
dataset is useful for its aggregation of candidate data, though I’ve added fundraising totals from
the FEC (which were not updated for the end of 2018 in the most recent DIME totals) and 2016
Presidential results by district from the Cook Political Report.184 DIME is most useful for its
CFscores (CF stands for campaign finance), which provide ideology estimates for all candidates,
not just former legislators, based on the donors who contribute to their campaigns.185 As is the
case with DW-nominate scores, 0 is the “center,” so I use the absolute value of the scores to
measure a candidate’s extremism. By a degree of necessity, I filter out candidates without
CFscores, and when comparing candidates to opponents, remove those without one in the
remainder of the data.186 I’ve also only included candidates who receive between 10 and 90
percent of the votes in the general election.187 Party and cycle were included to attempt to control
for year-to-year swings towards specific parties, in this case the 2018 “blue wave” for the
Democrats (this analysis is limited to 2016 and 2018).

For the latter, Bonica divides the most recent Democratic Presidential candidate’s vote share by the two-party
vote share in that district, but I was only able to replicate some of the figures based on either 2012 or 2016 Cook
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I model the relationship between a candidate’s spending advantage and electoral
performance relative to their party’s presidential candidate in their district.188 I found that some
candidates (i.e. Zak Ringelstein in the 2018 Maine Senate election) had abnormally low relative
performances due to special factors like 3-way races or “jungle” primaries.189 As such, I restrict
the data set to candidates who receive a vote share within 25 percentage points of the presidential
margin. Table 3.1 shows the results from a model looking at House and Senate candidates in
2016 and 2018.
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Table 1: The Effect of Itemized and Unitemized Contributions on Votes
Variables
Candidate
CFscore*
Unitemized
Contributions
(in millions)
Itemized
Contributions
(in millions)
Gender (male)
Controls
Party (Republican)
Cycle (2018 vs.
2016)
R2

All Candidates
-1.891
(p = .000)
-0.2016
(.420)

Incumbents
-2.633
(.001)
0.1357
(.658)

Challengers
-0.2093
(.605)
0.03070
(.939)

0.2670
(.036)

0.1973
(.233)

0.01256
(.947)

0.6716
(.072)

2.009
(.001)

-0.2432
(.583)

3.219
(.000)
0.3184
(.039)
.1027

2.974
(.000)
-0.8509
(.000)
.1085

3.106
(.000)
1.466
(.000)
.1261

Estimates from linear regression models. Entries are unstandardized coefficient estimates with p-values in
parentheses. Dependent variable is vote share difference between a candidate and the share received by their party’s
presidential candidate (in their district) in the 2016 election. 2016 and 2018 candidates only.
*90% of CFscores range between -1.52 and 1.28.

The results suggest that electoral success is not particularly well-explained by ideology,
fundraising, and gender (given the low R2). In the first model of Table 3.1 (with all candidates)
there is a significant relationship between itemized contributions and electoral performance but
all other fund-raising effects are insignificant. Incumbents who are more extreme receive fewer
votes to the tune of -2.6% for 1 point in CFscore, which grows to a 4.5% difference in comparing
the most moderate and most extreme candidates (0-1.8). We might expect more ideologicallyextreme candidates to be less popular with the median voter.190 Itemized contributions,
meanwhile, should correlate well with electoral performance because of the desire for “access”
that leads contributors to give to more-competitive candidates or those likely to win. Still, $1
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million in itemized contributions leads to only a 0.26% advantage over the 2016 presidential
baseline.
The non-challenger models are also the first indication that voters prefer male candidates,
though it is unclear why this bias would exist for incumbents but not challengers. Female
incumbents raised more from small donations than similar male colleagues (shown in Chapter 2),
and there may be an intricate relationship in which another cause of receiving those small
donations also leads to lower electoral success. The idea that small donors prefer female
candidates but male candidates do better electorally then implies that small donors are
significantly different from the overall population in more than ideology, otherwise men would
do comparably better with small donors or women with voters as a whole.
There are of course several flaws with using an aggregate measure of money raised, or
even money spent, in this model. One major issue is that many districts (or states) are much more
expensive to run in than others. Many districts lie in expensive media markets, some in multiple
markets (though that is more of an issue in Senate races). The expense of contact with voters
cannot be controlled for with district income since, for example, there are both extremely
wealthy and fairly poor districts within the very-expensive New York City market, and
candidates would potentially have less voter contact per dollar there than in Maine’s first district,
which lies in the Portland media market. So aggregate spending or aggregate relative spending is
a less effective measure than the percentage difference between opposing candidates’ fundraising
or expenditures totals, though even that is susceptible to differences in how money is spent.
Ultimately, using a relative share will provide the most optimal results possible without a more

67

fundamental understanding of how specific candidates are spending their money.191 Table 3.2 reestimates the models with fund-raising advantage, comparing them to their opponents.
Table 2: Fund-Raising Advantage and Vote Share
Variables
Candidate CFscore
Fundraising
Advantage (in
millions of $)
Gender (male)
Controls
Party (Republican)
Cycle
R2

All Candidates
-1.086
(.004)
0.5297
(.000)

Incumbents
-2.184
(.012)
0.4507
(.000)

Challengers
-0.4139
(.355)
0.5060
(.000)

0.151
(.696)

1.726
(.009)

-0.3856
(.400)

4.323
(.000)
0.4312
(.007)
.1735

4.482
(.000)
-1.064
(.000)
.1993

3.847
(.000)
1.516
(.000)
.1776

Estimates from linear regression models. Entries are unstandardized coefficient estimates with p-values in
parentheses. Dependent variable is vote share difference between a candidate and the share received by their party’s
presidential candidate (in their district) in the 2016 election.

Candidates with large spending advantages do extremely well relative to the party’s 2016
presidential baseline. The effect of spending advantage is significant for both incumbents and
challengers, and in the model of all candidates $1 million in extra spending leads to 0.53% of
additional relative vote share. This is suggestive of a fairly, though not extremely, strong
relationship between spending and success. It is important to recall that the average incumbent in
2016 and 2018 spent $1.5 million, and had a spending advantage of about $200,000 over their
opponent (from chapter 2). A million-dollar spending advantage is thus much larger than the
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typical candidate’s, though for more-expensive races such advantages are not uncommon.192
Findings for gender and for candidate extremism are similar to the earlier results.
Because this relationship models the difference between a candidate’s vote share and that
of Donald Trump or Hillary Clinton in their district, races which are less competitive should not
distort the results. Uncompetitive challengers may still be able to break the presidential baseline
without significant financial backing, while incumbents may still fall short despite it. Further,
donors concerned with “access” should not be concerned about funding those incumbents who
are less popular, especially if they are in a hyper-partisan district that ensures their reelection
anyway. But do candidates raise more money because they have more support, or do they have
more support because they’ve raised and spent more money? If donors as a whole tend to be
more ideologically extreme, and a candidate appeals primarily to the center, they will likely gain
fewer donors than they might have otherwise, since donors appear more polarized than the
population as a whole.193
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Table 3: Fund-Raising Advantage and Vote Share by Election Cycle, 2016-2018
Variables
Candidate CFscore
Fundraising
Advantage (in
millions of $)
Gender (male)
Controls
Party (Republican)
R2

2016 Candidates
-2.674
(.000)
0.7358
(.000)

2018 Candidates
-0.118
(.778)
0.3159
(.000)

0.654
(.304)

0.5156
(.205)

8.486
(.000)
.4167

.4773
(.220)
.048

Estimates from linear regression models. Entries are unstandardized coefficient estimates with p-values in
parentheses. Dependent variable is vote share difference between a candidate and the share received by their party’s
presidential candidate (in their district) in the 2016 election.

Analyzing 2016 results only (see Table 3.3), though, continues to demonstrate a strong
connection between fundraising and success. Candidates who were more ideologically extreme
were even less successful (compared to results in earlier tables) relative to the presidential
baseline, and an even larger spending advantage was necessary to attain additional votes. The
8.5-point advantage given to Republicans may at least be somewhat reflective of Donald Trump
losing the popular vote even as Republican House members beat Democrats by 1% nationally.
On the other hand, 2018 results do not demonstrate any sort of meaningful relationship for
candidate ideology. With such a disconnect between the figures in the two years, it is clear that
the circumstances of the two elections must be substantially different.
Separating the data from 2016 and 2018 should also be more effective than controlling
for cycle. Campaign cycles can be fundamentally different from one another, as moreindependent voters switching their backing and others choosing to show up or stay home hands
one party an advantage over the other. This makes controlling for party necessary and useful in
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single-cycle analyses, especially when candidates are being analyzed relative to their party’s
performance in a prior election cycle. However, controlling for a linear relationship between
campaign cycle/year and candidate performance fails to account for the interaction between party
and cycle as those change. Table 3.2 suggests an average improvement of 3% for challengers in
2018 over their 2016 counterparts,194 and a 2% decline for incumbents, which would indicate a
more-turbulent cycle in 2018. In a sense, this does reflect the Democratic wave in 2018, as most
losing incumbents were Republicans, and most winning challengers Democrats.
Table 4: Including Incumbency as a Control:
Variables
Candidate CFscore
Fundraising
Advantage (in
millions of $)
Gender (male)
Incumbent
Controls
Party (Republican)
R2

2016 Candidates
-1.627
(.006)
0.4489
(.004)

2018 Candidates
-0.0425
(.924)
0.3095
(.000)

0.4774
(.442)
2.951
(.000)

0.4927
(.229)
0.1933
(.634)

7.892
(.000)
.4448

.432
(.274)
.0473

Estimates from linear regression models. Entries are unstandardized coefficient estimates with p-values in
parentheses. Dependent variable is vote share difference between a candidate and the share received by their party’s
presidential candidate (in their district) in the 2016 election.

Table 3.4 adds incumbency as a control and shows an approximately 3% average “bump”
for incumbent legislators over 2016 presidential performance, but no such advantage appears in
the less-robust 2018 model. Controlling for incumbency also suggests spending an extra $1
million in 2016 would lead to a slightly-lower 0.45 percentage-point gain in vote share than the
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Since cycles are two years apart, and a change of 1 year causes a 1.5% change in vote share.
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0.74% in Table 3.3, a still-important figure, and lowers the maximum estimated effect from
ideology to about 2.5%. Since incumbents do outraise their opponents, it makes sense that
controlling for it would decrease the impact of spending; similarly, as incumbents are more
moderate, it makes sense that some of incumbency advantage was baked into that figure. It is
surprising, though, that incumbents experienced virtually no advantage in 2018 (as evidenced by
the null effect in the right column of Table 3.4).
The Most Competitive Races
In the most competitive races, we should expect donors interested in access to behave
differently than in less-competitive races, where they can give to a candidate virtually assured of
victory. Since competitive candidates have a reasonable chance of victory, we should also expect
them to attempt to maximize their chances; the motivations and effort of less-competitive
candidates may be more unclear. From this, we may expect contributions overall to better
distinguish who is a quality candidate. However, the volume of media about these races may also
minimize the effects of campaign spending itself, since voters will hear about the race much
more than they would about one that is less competitive. These races are also more expensive,
with the average candidate in 2016 spending $4,574,890 compared to $1,750,316 for all races.195
Diminishing marginal returns should then further lessen the effect of a dollar of spending.
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Based on the candidates included in each model.
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Table 5: Fund-Raising and Vote Share in Competitive Races
Variables
Candidate CFscore
Fundraising
Advantage (in
millions of $)
Unitemized
Contributions (in
millions of $)
Itemized
Contributions (in
millions of $)
Gender (male)
Controls
Party (Republican)
R2

2016 Candidates
-7.007
(.003)
-0.01506
(.962)

2016 Candidates
-7.086
(.004)

2018 Candidates
-3.576
(.007)
0.169
(.010)

2018 Candidates
-3.848
(.005)

-0.2716
(.749)

0.4084
(.362)

0.2048
(.610)

-0.1629
(.471)

-0.8917
(.653)

-0.8607
(.666)

0.5578
(.504)

.4901
(.561)

4.590
(.005)
.2209

4.555
(.005)
.2136

-2.631
(.005)
.081

-3.322
(.000)
.0659

Estimates from linear regression models. Entries are unstandardized coefficient estimates with p-values in
parentheses. Dependent variable is vote share difference between a candidate and the share received by their party’s
presidential candidate (in their district) in the 2016 election. Set of candidates who received between 45 and 55% of
general election vote.

Table 3.5 looks only at candidates who received between 45 and 55 percent of the general
election vote. In these most-competitive races, candidate ideology has an even more profound
effect on votes, with the difference between the most moderate and extreme incumbents
amounting to about a 10% difference in vote share relative to the 2016 Presidential results.
Fundraising advantage, meanwhile, was unrelated to votes in 2016 and was only significant in
2018 at 0.17% per additional million raised. The direction for party finally reflected much of the
shift between 2016 and 2018, meaning Republicans out-performed Trump in 2016 but lagged
behind his 2016 vote share in the midterms.
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Table 6: Fund-Raising and Vote Share in Primaries
Variables
Candidate CFscore
Itemized
Contributions (in
millions of $)
Unitemized
Contributions (in
millions of $)
Gender (male)
R2

Primary Losers
-1.789
(.001)
6.864
(.000)
-5.016
(.000)
0.3986
(.634)
.0186

Estimates from linear regression models. Entries are unstandardized coefficient estimates with p-values in
parentheses. Dependent variable is candidate vote share (0-100) in the primary (but in practice that cannot be above
50 if this includes only losers).

Table 3.6 looks at primary losers. Modeling the effect of spending on primaries requires
data on fundraising prior to the primary date, since primary winners will raise substantial sums
afterwards in preparation for the general election. Unfortunately, the FEC only offers full reports
on fundraising totals through the end of the election cycle, which I have used, though even
quarterly reports would be ineffective if a candidate receives a fundraising windfall directly after
a primary victory. Using fundraising through the end of the first quarter of the election year may
be an effective replacement,196 but I was unable to find an aggregate set of this information.
Without it, I have modeled how fundraising totals affect vote shares for primary losers, since
their fundraising effectively ends with that loss. We should still expect a direct and predictable
relationship between fundraising and success since partisan leanings of the electorate become
less meaningful. However, having information on relative spending, overall expense in the race,
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Most primaries occur before the end of the second quarter, and candidates may see a fundraising bump
immediately after winning a competitive primary, whether it is from existing supporters or undecideds who planned
on contributing to the eventual nominee.

74

and candidate name recognition (primarily from experience in elected or appointed office) would
help clarify the relationship and potentially establish a better predictive model.
Greater precision can also be found by separating primary opponents of incumbents, and
individuals competing to run for an open seat or against an incumbent of the opposing party.
Incumbents should have a large fundraising advantage over their primary opponents, and may
require a much larger fundraising total to overcome, cases like Brat vs. Cantor notwithstanding.
In races without an incumbent, two candidates are on a more-level playing field and should be
able to properly compete with much less in funding. However, the most accurate results will only
come when also analyzing the winners of those primaries, with their fundraising totals through
the date of that election.
In Table 3.6, there is an opposing relationship between itemized and unitemized
contributions, and a significant effect for CFscores, though the predictive measure of funding
and ideology on vote share for primary losers is practically zero (in looking at the model’s R2).
The negative effects of unitemized contributions should just lead to underperformance relative to
a candidate, usually an incumbent, who receives more of their share in itemized contributions,
but because those itemized contributions still substantially outnumber their small counterparts in
any given election, the association between spending and vote share would be positive (and
likely significant). However, given the already-established relationship between primary
fundraising and electoral success as detailed by Bonica,197 we should expect a better predictive
measure.

Adam Bonica, “Professional Networks, Early Fundraising, and Electoral Success” (December 28, 2016): 2.
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2891145.
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Facebook Spending
Sometimes money is just used to raise more money in a cycle that inflates totals but does
not necessarily aim for, or result in, increasing the broader level of support for a candidate,
particularly when a campaign’s most ardent supporters are both the most likely donors and voters
for that candidate. For example, the Trump campaign spent nearly half of its $800 million in
expenditures prior to September 2020 trying to raise more money,198 though it’s possible that this
push did still have a small impact on undecided voters. Campaigns can also have different levels
of administrative costs, whether from researching and determining strategy, spending on
producing media, or simply operating more or less efficiently. The Lincoln Project, for example,
while not a campaign, had spent only about $200,000 placing advertisements by the end of
March 2020, but had spent almost the same amount producing those ads and sent almost $1
million to a strategic communications firm run by the group’s treasurer.199
Spending on actual communications can also be more effective depending on the type of
message, or the way in which that spending is spread (some voters can only be reached on
certain platforms). Digital spending, such as advertising on Facebook, has become increasingly
popular for campaigns, but not all candidates have been quick to move towards its use. While
trying to argue that Democrats did not lose Congressional races due to attitudes about the
Progressive movement, Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez commented on Conor Lamb, an incumbent
Representative from Pennsylvania who narrowly won reelection and who spent $2,000 on

Shane Goldmacher and Maggie Haberman, “How Trump’s Billion-Dollar Campaign Lost Its Cash Advantage,”
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Facebook the week before the election. She claimed “if you’re not spending $200,000 on
Facebook with fund-raising, persuasion, volunteer recruitment, get-out-the vote the week before
the election, you are not firing on all cylinders.”200
Table 7: Facebook Spending, Fund-Raising Advantage, and Vote Share
Variables
Candidate CFscore
Facebook Spending
Gender (male)
Controls
Party (Republican)
Cycle
Fundraising
Advantage
(in millions of $)
Itemized
Contributions
(in millions of $)
Unitemized
Contributions
(in millions of $)
R2

All Candidates
-1.509
(.121)
3.862e-05
(.005)
1.527
(.056)

All Candidates
-1.835
(.057)
2.970e-05
(.019)
1.534
(.052)

0.9535
(.124)
-0.2908
(.370)

1.413
(.027)
-0.3064
(.339)
2.804e-07
(.036)

-2.646e-07
(.269)
4.270e-08
(.903)
.0658

.0783

Estimates from linear regression models. Entries are unstandardized coefficient estimates with p-values in
parentheses. Dependent variable is vote share difference between a candidate and the share received by their
party’s presidential candidate (in their district) in the 2016 election.

If Facebook or digital spending is part of a more effective campaign strategy, we should
expect to see a correlation between Facebook spending and candidate success against the 2016
presidential baseline in a candidate’s district while controlling for fundraising or spending, since

Astead W. Herndon, “Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez on Biden’s Win, House Losses, and What’s Next for the Left,”
New York Times, November 16, 2020, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/11/07/us/politics/aoc-bidenprogressives.html.
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candidates who have more money will be able to spend more on all methods of reaching voters.
Including data on Facebook spending from the last two weeks of the 2020 cycle and using it as a
proxy for digital or campaign savvy in 2016 and 2018,201 I find a significant relationship between
spending on Facebook and candidate success, with candidates receiving 3.8% more for every
$100,000 or so in spending for those two weeks, a number that indicates a solid portion of
success can be driven by strategy. Rather importantly, a candidate’s overall spending advantage
becomes only slightly significant in this model.

Summary and Conclusion
The effect of campaigns on electoral outcome is not clear, as media outreach and contact
with voters often displays a bump in support that decreases over time, making the impact of the
outreach eventually zero, but several studies have found small positive impacts on vote share
from candidate spending more broadly. It remains possible that spending is correlated with
success even if the effects of that spending are not, since more-popular candidates should
perform better with donors. However, that fundraising may be a double-edged sword, as too
much support, particularly if it comes from less-popular groups like the wealthy and out-ofstaters, can also open up that candidate to allegations that they and their supporters are
attempting to “buy” the election – though that may actually have no final impact as well.
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The only included candidates are those who ran in 2020 and at least one of the prior two cycles, in addition to
having listed Facebook spending. This is admittedly a weak test of strategy effects on outcomes. I was not able to
look only at candidate Facebook spending in the 2018 election, and Facebook did not release this information for the
2016 election. As such, I am using digital spending in 2020 as a proxy for the likely digital outreach employed in
prior campaigns.
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Analyzing fundraising and election performance for 2016 and 2018 candidates
demonstrates a significant relationship between candidate spending and electoral performance.
Candidates gain 0.53 percent more of the vote for every $1 million more they raise than their
opponent, an advantage lower than incumbency or being an ideological moderate, but which
could be significant at higher levels of spending. However, this advantage shrunk to just 0.17%
in the most competitive races in 2018, and was insignificant in the most competitive races of
2016, perhaps a good example of oversaturation of information for voters.
Candidates who received more in itemized donations also performed better than those
who received more in small donations, except in the most competitive races in 2018. While it is
still difficult to dissociate whether spending fuels support or is a byproduct of it, candidates who
spent more on Facebook advertising outperformed slightly more. It is difficult to believe that the
millions of dollars candidates spend on federal campaigns have no impact, but minimal effects
makes sense when voters are often bombarded with competing ideas.
More ideologically-extreme candidates also perform somewhat or significantly worse
than comparable, more-moderate candidates. The effect of 1 point in CFscore varies from about
1% to 7% of vote share, implying that a candidate with the same score as Bill Nelson (CFscore 0.75) would perform 1% better than a candidate with the same score as Bernie Sanders (CFscore
-1.8). Importantly, the 7% effect is when only considering the closest races of 2016, implying
voters were much more willing to support more-moderate candidates and potentially cross party
lines to do so. The decrease of this effect in 2018 to about -3.5 (still looking at the closest races)
implies stronger partisanship, or a willingness to support candidates who may be less moderate.
If spending is mostly irrelevant in what candidate wins a general election, particularly
when examining the most competitive races, concerns over the role of small contributions in
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supporting more ideologically-extreme candidates perhaps should be focused on primary
elections, where spending might matter more and the “penalties” for extremism may be lower, or
reversed. Primaries are the only election that matters in many districts, so better understanding
the relationship between small donations, ideology, and electoral results in primaries is crucial to
anticipating the effects of public matching or furthered attempts to tap into this expanding donor
pool. As it stands, implementing voucher programs or other ways of encouraging new and lesspartisan donors to engage in the finance process would be a “safer bet,” but unless recipients are
involved in that primary process, it appears a possibility that public funding will not make much
of a difference.
The final, concluding chapter of this paper will discuss the implications of the findings of
Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 on potential solutions to the problem of “big money” in politics. The
correlation between receiving more in small donations and having a more-extreme CFscore, and
the relationship between fundraising and success, suggests that these more-extreme candidates
may be advantaged by public campaign finance programs centered around small donors.
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Chapter 4: Considering Campaign Finance Reforms (and Conclusion)
To some extent, the preceding chapters of this paper presuppose a problem with “big
money” in politics, particularly the overrepresentation of wealthy donors in the funding of
political campaigns. This overrepresentation is irrefutable from a purely monetary perspective,
and these concerns are not unfounded. In 2016, 15,810 individuals, less than 0.0001% of the
American population, accounted for half of all political contributions,202 an amount totaling
several billion dollars.203 Furthermore, former Nebraska Senator Bob Kerrey has wondered “is
Americans for Prosperity going to advertise against me in a primary, yes or no?”204 Joe
Scarborough explicitly states that from his experience in Congress, “across the spectrum, money
changed votes,”205 while Senator Chris Murphy of Connecticut states “you’re hearing a lot about
problems that bankers have and not a lot of problems that people who work in the mill in
Thomaston, Conn. have.”206 Yet Stephen Ansolabehere, John De Figueiredo, and James Snyder,
in their paper, “Why Is There So Little Money in U.S. Politics?” documented how most studies
on PAC contributions found insignificant or negative connections between contributions from
interest groups and support (votes) for an issue.207
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However, “clean elections” may be more important as a perspective than as a reality,208
and the perception is that our politicians are beholden to the people who give them money. A
post-Citizens United poll found that over 70 percent of respondents “agreed” that representatives
were “controlled” by the principal funders of their campaigns.209 The Brennan Center for Justice
argues that “the reality, or even the perception, that campaign donors call the shots on major
policy decisions is deeply corrosive to our democracy.”210 The increased role of small donations,
and proposed public financing programs, whether grants, vouchers, tax rebates, or public
matching, may help lessen the perspective that members of Congress care primarily about large
donors, and could help candidates with less access to these same wealthy donors win elections.
Of course, it’s not clear that by increasing the role of small donations, politicians will act
more independently or be less considerate of larger donations. When he was in the Senate,
Kerrey probably would have considered Americans for Prosperity’s perspective to avoid their
support of an opponent. Relying on small donations may be a riskier proposition for current
incumbents trained in one primary method of fundraising. In addition, public matching programs
that force participating candidates to accept lower limits on individual contributions are unable to
prevent outside spending, in which case candidates may try to simultaneously court small donors
and the backing of Super PACs and 501(c)4 “dark money”211 group.
It is also important to consider that large donations do not necessarily have a major
impact on the outcome of elections. In chapter 3, I found that candidates who received $1 million
more than their opponent would beat Hillary Clinton or Donald Trump’s share of the two-party
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vote by 0.53 percent, and that large donations generally correlated with better performance and
small donations with worse performance, but the impact of fundraising became insignificant
when considering elections decided by less than 10 percent of the vote. Money may still be
useful in primaries, but I was unable to provide a detailed analysis in that chapter. Additional
small donations and money from public programs like vouchers will also not help in the mostimportant fundraising period of primaries, the seed round. According to Adam Bonica, lawyers
and doctors are so well-represented in Congress because of their success in this round of
fundraising, where they tap their personal network of high-salaried friends and colleagues.212
EMILY’s List, meanwhile, equates early money with “yeast” since “it makes the dough rise.”213

Solutions to the Perception or Problems of “Big Money” in Politics
The most obvious solution to “big money” in politics, regulating it, is much more
difficult with the Supreme Court’s emphasis on the right to freedom of speech and its definition
of corruption as cash directly resulting in votes. Buckley v. Valeo established an inability to
“suppress communications” through “ceilings on expenditures” except for the goal of preventing
“quid pro quo” corruption.214 Citizens United later limited that definition of “quid pro quo”
corruption to “dollars for political favors,” adding that “the appearance of influence or access,
furthermore, will not cause the electorate to lose faith in our democracy.”215 As long as the
expectation is that political favors are not encouraged by unlimited outside spending, or by the
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current limits on direct contributions to candidates, it seems likely that specific restrictions on
large spenders will get struck down as too restrictive on speech.
However, there may be greater benefit in fighting spending with more spending, rather
than trying to establish a set of restrictions that may be too onerous on issue advocates or too
permissive towards those who attempt to skirt the rules. The focus should be on outside
spending, as individuals prevented from giving more to specific campaigns may be able to give
to PACs or interest groups like the NRA instead. Even if the government was able to instill
somewhat-low limits on outside spending, individuals and organizations like the NRA would
still deserve and possess the right to advertise and advocate for or against legislative action in
print, on television, or online.
In a polarized society, the line between a political advertisement and an issue
advertisement can often be blurred. Ads telling viewers or readers to “call you representative,” or
a specific Senator, and “tell them you support protecting the Second Amendment” may not state
that they should support or vote for a Republican candidate, but the delineation between the two
parties on gun rights makes the implication clear.
There is also the issue of where to “draw the line” on explicit political spending: A full
page ad in the Sunday New York Times costs $245,000216 while a large stack of posters and
hanging materials might cost a few hundred dollars or even less; is the latter more permissible
simply because fewer people will be reached by the communication? And how is printing posters
different from receiving and putting up a yard sign? In a situation where cost and reach are not
always directly correlated, drawing a specific line anywhere makes no sense.
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Small donors may be the existing “solution” to this problem. 22% of contributions made
by the end of September in the 2020 election cycle came from small donations, up from 15% in
2016,217 suggesting that they could become more viable as a primary source of funding for
campaigns. Public matching programs, in which a candidate typically agrees to a lower
maximum contribution size in return for receiving public funding at a proportional rate, often $6
for every $1, for small donations received, would put this current method of funding campaigns
on steroids. 6:1 public matching may also incentivize more individuals to contribute to
candidates, but unless it is widely advertised a mix of lack of information and the original costs
of contributing218 may also prevent that expansion of the donor base. I did not establish that
candidates who would opt into such a matching program would be more ideologically extreme,
but Chapter 2 established that candidates who receive a higher share of small donations are more
ideologically extreme and those candidates would be the greatest potential beneficiaries of such a
program. These ideologically-extreme candidates would not be representative of the broader
population as a whole, which is bell-shaped rather than bimodal.219
Vouchers are another public financing proposal, but one that would primarily rely on
increasing the number of donors. There are two different methods of achieving this type of
program: The first, vouchers themselves, has been championed by authors like Lawrence Lessig
and Richard Hasen, and often gets a cute name like “democracy dollars.” Vouchers have been
included in H.R. 1 as a pilot program in three to-be-determined states, though at the level of $25
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per recipient220 rather than Lessig and Hasen’s proposals of $50 or $100.221 The second, a tax
rebate, has been proposed by the conservative Richard Painter. There are benefits and downsides
to each variation as well. A voucher system will be more complicated for government agencies
and for campaigns, while tax rebates are more complicated for individuals (many of whom may
not be told that such a rebate exists). Giving individuals money in the present, rather than telling
them they’ll be recompensated in the future, may also provide a greater incentive to actually
contribute.
Table 1: Preferences for Public Campaign Financing Proposals
Question
A: Public funding for taking only
small donations
B: “Taxpayer-funded grants” for
taking only small donations
C: Voters receive up to $200 in
“government-issued vouchers”
D: Voters receive up to $200 in
tax rebates
H: “Using tax dollars” in public
financing is a good way to level
the playing field between
incumbents and challengers
I: H, but just “a public funding
system for our elections”
L: 6:1 small donor matching with
public funding
M: L, funded with penalties from
those committing tax fraud
N: L, but using “taxpayer dollars”

Democrats

Republicans

Independents

All

3.043

4.42

3.695

3.64

3.39

4.462

4.518

3.94

4.074

4.975

4

4.251

3.573

4.425

3.714

3.734

3.47

5.233

3.78

3.98

2.73

4.17

3.615

3.512

3.807

5

4.829

4.328

3.608

4.613

4

4.039

3.83

5.5

5.152

4.633

Each cell includes the mean and response breakdown; 1 means “strongly agree” and 7 means “strongly disagree.”
Ordered from 1 to 7 starting from the left.
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Vouchers are also less popular than other public financing proposals. Table 1 shows
selected responses from a national survey by the Wesleyan Media Project, shared with the
permission of Michael Franz. Respondents in the sample were from an online panel, but
weighted to reflect census data. As part of the survey, they were asked to score various public
finance proposals on a 7-point scale, where a 1 is “strongly agree” and a 7 is “strongly disagree.”
Those respondents scored a tax rebate proposal at a 3.734, while vouchers scored a 4.251. Small
donor matching actually performed worse than the voucher system with a score of 4.328, rising
to a 4.633 when primed with “using taxpayer dollars.” The survey does demonstrate that the
framing of any proposal is crucial. Matching funds score a more-neutral 4.039 when respondents
were told that public matching would be funded with penalties from people convicted of tax
fraud, and the difference between scores when taxpayer dollars are mentioned for question pair
A and B and for question pair H and I, like the difference between L and N, is about 0.3. Voters
may also be more supportive if they understood the magnitude of the program: If 200 million
Americans each spent $25 in public funds, that would only cost the government $5 billion, and
would actually still be substantially less than the amount spent by private actors on the 2020
elections.222 Of course, $200 would be another story in terms of potential public investment in
the electoral process.
Voters also respond well to the idea of “levelling the playing field” between incumbents
and challengers, a sign that presenting the purpose of specific legislation may improve its
popularity, and that voters may view incumbents as having an unfair advantage in fundraising for
their campaigns. “A public funding system for our elections is a good way to level the playing
field between incumbents and challengers” scored a 3.512, including a 2.73 from Democrats.

222

“2020 election to cost $14 billion, blowing away spending records,” OpenSecrets.org.

87

Voters who identified as Democratic on a 3-point party ID scale were more likely to support
every public financing proposal, though the sample size of the responses was particularly small
for Republicans. The most damaging sign for the prospects of a “democracy dollar” voucher
program is that it was the only proposal for which Democratic-identifying respondents leaned
more towards opposition than support.
Conclusion
There are two equally compelling but opposing possible views of small donors and small
contributions in federal elections. Small donations are accessible to a large portion of Americans;
we spent almost as much on potato chips as was spent on federal campaigns in 2012, a
Presidential cycle223 (and federal elections are only every other year!). 12 percent of respondents
in the 2016 American National Election Survey claimed they donated to a political candidate that
cycle,224 a surprisingly high number when only 1.6 million Americans contributed more than
$200 to federal campaigns that cycle.225 The campaign finance system is much more than the
15,810 donors who provided half of that cycle’s campaign funds,226 and the federal government
has the ability to adopt programs that would encourage more Americans to participate or “level
the playing field” between those who do. When a tiny fraction of the population funds a
significant portion of American elections, and the threat or promise of that money affects the
behavior or actions of politicians, it is more difficult to envision the “government of the people”
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described by Abraham Lincoln in the Gettysburg Address, and which is the essential translation
of the word “democracy.”
On the other hand, the “everyday” Americans who contribute to campaigns but are not
part of the elite circle may not be that representative of the actual “Everyman.” Voters
themselves actually follow a bell curve in terms of ideology, but the distribution of political
contributors by ideology is bimodal, with more-partisan (or ideologically extreme) individuals
more likely to donate,227 especially if they have more-extreme perspectives of the opposing
party, though they often contribute in light of two-party competition rather than strictly
individual preferences.228 Meanwhile, most of the 30 wealthiest Americans are closer to the
center than either the Republican or the Democratic Parties,229 so their contributions may better
reflect “everyday” Americans than the typical small donor.230 To some extent, we are left with a
catch-22: Celebrating and encouraging the increasing role of small donations in federal elections
takes power away from unrepresentative individuals in terms of wealth and power, and pushes it
towards a group that is unrepresentative in terms of ideology. There are two massive paradigm
shifts in campaign finance that could occur from an increased emphasis on small donations, and
one centered around this existing donor population is likely to strengthen partisan divides and
threaten more-moderate incumbents in primary challenges.
For the American campaign finance system to truly be more representative of its voting
population, it does not simply need smaller donors to equal or surpass the power of the most
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influential contributors, it needs more donors (who would likely be small donors) who reflect the
actual voter population. Moderate donors could oppose extremist candidates in both primaries
and general elections, even when they are registered independents, and finance programs that
target this largely untapped population, especially if they are paired with other democratizing
reforms, are an important step in ensuring the voice of every American is not just heard at the
ballot box, but in the bank accounts of campaigns as well. Elections aren’t won simply because
of money, but we have a duty in ensuring they never appear to be.
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